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Abstract 
Two-sided payment card markets generate costs that have to be distributed among the 
participating actors. For this purpose, payment card networks set an interchange fee, which 
is the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank per transaction. While in 
recent years many antitrust authorities all over the world - including the European 
Commission - have opened proceedings against card brands in order to verify whether 
agreements to collectively establish the level of interchange fees are anticompetitive, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia – as a regulator - has directly tried to address market failures by 
lowering the level of interchange fees and changing some network rules. The US has 
followed with new legislation on financial consumer protection, which also intervenes on 
interchange fees. This has opened a strong debate not only on legitimacy of interchange fees, 
but also on the appropriateness of different public tools to address such issues. Drawing 
from economic and legal theories and a comparative analysis of recent case law in the EU 
and other jurisdictions, this work investigates whether a regulation rather than a purely 
competition policy approach would be more appropriate in this field, considering in 
particular, at EU level, all of the competition and regulatory concerns that have arisen from 
the operation of SEPA with multilateral interchange fees. The paper concludes that a wider 
regulation approach could address some of the shortcomings of a purely antitrust approach, 
proving to be highly beneficial to the development of an efficient European single payments 
area. 
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1. Introduction 
In November 2008, a study was released by the World Bank on cooperation and competition 
in retail payment systems (hereinafter, 2008 WB study).1 This study addressed, among other 
issues, the extent to which efficiency, access and innovation are determined by cooperation 
and competition among market players, and what are the main drivers of these factors. As a 
first step, it stated that the key drivers of cooperation and competition are environmental, 
legal and legacy issues, as well as governance, access and pricing and that the focal point is 
the trade-off between cooperation and competition. Then, it illustrated guidelines for a 
policy response through the oversight function over payment systems and cooperation 
among authorities. In particular, it concluded that effective oversight of payment systems is 
the major tool at the authorities’ disposal with which to address market and coordination 
failures in the national payment systems. Central banks are the natural overseers of these 
systems as the only authority able to ensure that all public policy goals are aligned, whereas 
other authorities – such as competition authorities – can play an important ancillary role. 
The 2008 WB study was mainly undertaken because of the increasing awareness of the role 
of cooperation and competition in the overall efficiency of the (retail) payment systems, and 
because of the widely diverging opinions on how to address their shortcomings. Since then, 
the debate in this domain has grown fierce, attracting the attention of regulators, scholars 
and market operators. Among these shortcomings, that of multilateral interchange fees 
(hereinafter, MIFs)2 in cards has especially attracted the interest of both competition and 
regulatory authorities, as well as spurred a strong reaction by the market against some of the 
measures adopted. Both economic and legal doctrines have contributed substantive 
arguments to the debate. 
Recently, in the context of the European efforts to achieve a unified European payment 
system – the so-called Single Euro Payments Area (hereinafter, SEPA) – special attention was 
devoted by the European Commission to MIFs under antitrust principles. At the same time, 
the mentioned interest in these pricing schemes also raised the issue of the authority best 
suited to evaluate them. 
Indeed, the introduction of the euro as a single currency in 1999-2002 was one of the most 
important steps in the integration process of the European financial market. Harmonisation 
of national payment systems of all the member states of the European Union (EU), in 
addition to Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, started in January 2008. SEPA is 
now the next key event in the development of an integrated European money market. The 
main aim of the migration from domestic systems to SEPA is both to make payments easier, 
faster and more convenient for European customers, and to enhance competition in the 
European retail market which is expected to lead to lower prices. By eliminating technical, 
legal and commercial barriers, SEPA is intended to make non-cash payments within the euro 
                                                     
1 G. Guadamillas (Coordinator) (2008), “Balancing Cooperation and Competition in Retail Payment 
Systems - Lessons from Latin America Case Studies”, Financial Infrastructures Series - Payment 
Systems Policy and Research, World Bank, Washington, D.C., November. 
2 The CPSS Glossary defines interchange fees as the fees applied for a network organisation, and paid 
by the card-issuing institution to the acquiring bank for the cost of deploying and maintaining ATMs 
and POS. Since this paper focuses on credit card networks, MIFs shall mean the fees that are paid by 
the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank per transaction under the pricing conditions uniformly 
set by the network. 
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area as easy and efficient as it is within a single national payment system.3 The creation of a 
pan-European playing field is likely to increase competition between financial institutions 
and to bring about increased compatibility and scale economies, thus resulting in lower costs 
for customers and merchants.4 
Although one of the main declared goals of the process is indeed to enhance competition, the 
migration to SEPA still presents a number of challenges from an antitrust perspective. In 
order to identify possible weaknesses in the retail sector that could distort or restrict 
competition and to discover valuable information that could be used to inspire the future 
developments of the SEPA process, in 2007 the European Commission launched a sector 
inquiry on retail banking.5 This inquiry concluded that a major competition issue could be 
the introduction of a higher level of MIFs in cards. According to the Commission, even if 
these default MIFs would be able to guarantee that transactions between all financial 
institutions in Europe participating in the SEPA process would be possible because 
agreements existed between members of the card network, they may have led to higher 
tariffs than those paid in some member states. This risk was considered to be real, given that 
there are countries in the European payments market where the level of interchange fee was 
(is) low or where card schemes would operate without an MIF.6 
On the other side, the Commission is certainly not unaccustomed to evaluating MIFs under 
competition law. Back in 2002, when examining the consistency of cross-border MIFs of Visa 
with European law, it ascertained a violation of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter, TFEU) on anticompetitive agreements. 
However, it then granted an exemption according to Article 101(3) TFEU, allowing 
agreements that while anticompetitive in nature, may benefit the market under a number of 
conditions (hereinafter, VISA II decision)7. In that context, the Commission thus seemed to 
take the view that MIFs could in principle be anticompetitive but that the question of their 
anti-competitiveness could be concretely resolved only after an assessment of their level. In a 
more recent decision concerning MasterCard (hereinafter, MasterCard decision),8 however, 
the Commission examined the effects of MIFs only on one side of the market, i.e. the 
acquiring one, thereby disregarding possible benefits in the organisation of the offer of the 
                                                     
3 W. Bolt and H. Schmiedel (2009), “SEPA, Efficiency and Payment Card Competition”, ECB Working 
Paper series, ECB, Frankfurt, December, p. 9. 
4 On the analysis of the potential benefits from SEPA in the European payment market see C. Beijnen 
and W. Bolt (2009), “Size Matters: Economies of Scale in European Payments Processing”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 203; W. Bolt and D. Humphrey (2007), “Payment Network Scale 
Economies, SEPA, and Cash Replacement”, Review of Network Economics, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 453; K. 
Kemppainen (2008), “Integrating European Retail Payment Systems: Some Economics of SEPA”, Bank 
of Finland Discussion Paper, No. 22, Bank of Finland, Helsinki; G. Schaefer (2008), “An Economic 
Analysis of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA)”, FIW Working Paper, No. 11, FIW, Vienna; H. 
Schmiedel (2007), “The Economic Impact of the Single Euro Payments Area”, ECB Occasional Paper 
Series, No. 71, ECB, Frankfurt. 
5 European Commission (2007), Sector Inquiry under Art. 17 of Regulation 1/2003 on Retail Banking, 
COM(2007)33 final, Brussels, 31.1.2007. 
6 European Commission (2007), Report on the Retail Banking Sector Inquiry, European Commission 
Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication from the Commission - Sector Inquiry 
under Art. 17 of Regulation 1/2003 on Retail Banking, SEC(2007) 106, Brussels, 31.1.2007, pp. 97-101. 
7 Commission Decision of 24.07.2002, Visa International - Multilateral Interchange Fee, [2002] O.J. L. 318, 
22.11.2002. 
8 Commission Decision of 19.12.2007, MasterCard, [2007] COMP/34.579. 
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payment service and thus finding an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU without granting 
any exemption. 
Moreover, these recent developments of European law are not isolated cases. For the last few 
years, regulators and antitrust authorities around the world have increasingly intervened in 
the field of payment card systems. In Australia, for example, the Reserve Bank (RBA) 
eliminated the ‘no discrimination’ rule that had been in effect in card networks agreements 
and significantly reduced interchange fees. In this context, the Governor of the RBA 
expressly stated that, even if the best way to improve efficiency is to leave the market to free 
competition, retail payment systems “are constructed in such a way that competition 
increases costs and reduces efficiency”.9 As a consequence, retail payments regulation would 
be needed. In this case, it was the regulatory authority that intervened and it is thought that 
other central banks will be inclined to follow similar routes. Among these, the intervention 
most discussed is that of the US Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), under the so-called Durbin 
Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act, imposing caps on interchange fees and limiting 
network exclusivity. These new provisions are part of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act 
(EFTA), which regulates consumer transactions. As a result, such amendments indeed were 
meant to be aimed at consumer protection. 
One stance thus seems to be shared by authorities, i.e. the need for public intervention in this 
domain. Those who are in favour of a regulatory or antitrust intervention offer a number of 
arguments to support their claim, which can be briefly summarised as follows: 
 First of all, MIFs would subsidise card holders, thus creating an incentive for 
customers to prefer card payment over other potentially less-expensive means of 
payment. From an economic point of view, the fact that card holders are not charged 
the marginal cost of using a card would lead to an excessive use of payment card 
systems.10  
 Second, given that merchants are accustomed to passing the fees they have to pay onto 
users – regardless of the means of payment used by them – interchange fees would 
lead to generally higher prices for goods and services.11  
 Finally, despite the general agreement that interchange fees play a beneficial role in 
addressing the externalities caused by the fact that the cards market is a two-sided 
market, member banks would have an incentive to set fees at the level that maximises 
their profits.12 
Notwithstanding this perceived agreement among authorities, and the fierce opposition of 
the market and by some scholars, the issue has not been fully addressed whether such public 
intervention should take the form of antitrust intervention against anticompetitive behaviour 
or of regulation (or, more properly, oversight). The WB 2008 study did conclude that 
oversight of the retail payment systems is crucial to balancing cooperation and competition 
issues and ensuring adequate governance, access and pricing. This is because achieving 
                                                     
9 I.J. Macfarlane (2005), “Gresham’s Law of Payments,” speech to AIBF Industry Forum, Sydney, RBA 
Bulletin, Vol. 8, p. 13. 
10 D.D. Garcia Swartz, R.W. Hahn and A.L. Farrar (2006), “The Move Toward a Cashless Society: a 
Closer Look at Payment Instrument Economics”, Review of Network Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 183-
188. 
11 J. Gans and S.P. King (2001), “The Role of Interchange Fees in Credit Card Associations: Competitive 
Analysis and Regulatory Options”, Australian Business Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 121-123. See, 
infra, § 2.1. 
12 A. Frankel and A. Shampine (2006), “The Economic Effects of Interchange Fees“, Antitrust L.J., Vol. 
73, No. 3, p. 649. See, infra, § 2.2. 
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multiple public policy objectives to maximise social welfare, in the context of retail 
payments, requires certain trade-offs. In particular, the lack of an overarching objective 
means that there is a greater need to reconcile multiple public-policy goals relating to safety 
and efficiency, reliability, competition, access and consumer/data protection.13 Yet, it also 
mentioned the need for cooperation among authorities, as each is tasked with ensuring the 
attainment of specific objectives, including freedom of competition. Moreover, 
considerations in the 2008 WB study stress the role of the overseer of the national payment 
systems as that of reconciling multiple public policy goals, whereas MIFs as such would 
seem at a first glance only to relate to competition principles, although efficiency is also at 
stake. 
In light of the above, the 2008 WB study, together with the recent EU experience, sheds light 
on pros and cons of antitrust or regulatory intervention in this field. 
To answer these questions, this paper starts by briefly explaining the economics of 
interchange fees, acknowledging some of the major conclusions reached in the still highly 
controversial debate on externalities of MIFs. Then, we will consider, in particular, the SEPA 
initiative and the main consequences of the introduction of a unified MIF in Europe, also 
according to existing case law and comparing this experience with that of other countries 
where central banks intervened instead of the antitrust authorities. Finally, we will try to 
investigate the most appropriate approach to the issue, comparing advantages and 
drawbacks of regulatory and competition policy, in the hope of reaching some guiding 
principles of a more general nature, or at least stimulating a new debate. 
2. Payment Systems as a Two-Sided Market 
2.1 The Economics of Four-Party Credit Card Transactions and 
Interchange Fees 
Video game consoles, the newspaper industry, auction houses and shopping malls are all 
examples of ‘two-sided markets’. According to the definition given by J. C. Rochet and J. 
Tirole, these are “markets in which platforms offer interaction services to two (or several) categories 
of end-users”.14 Shopping malls, for example, link retailers and shoppers. 
Generally speaking, three conditions must be fulfilled in order to have a two-sided market. 
First of all, there must be two different groups of customers. Secondly, because of the 
membership externality,15 the value one group of end-users obtains increases in parallel with 
the number of people on the other side of the market. Finally, a common platform created by 
an intermediary is necessary in order to allow interaction between the two sides and to have 
                                                     
13 See in particular pp. 25-26 of the study. See also B. Bossone and M. Cirasino (2001), “The Oversight 
of Payments Systems: A Framework for the Development and Governance of Payment Systems in 
Emerging Economies”, Payment and Securities Clearance and Settlement Systems Research Series, CEMLA-
World Bank, Washington, D.C., July.  
14 J. C. Rochet and J. Tirole (2008), “Competition Policy in Two-Sided Markets, with a Special 
Emphasis on Payment Cards” in P. Buccirossi (eds), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge: MIT 
Press, p. 543. 
15 Ibid., p. 554. 
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the two groups “on board”.16 This means that both sides of the market are essential in order 
to have the product.17 
Also payment cards (and, in general, payment systems) can be considered an example of a 
two-sided market. As a matter of fact, in order to carry out the transaction, the participation 
of the two involved customer groups (cardholders and merchants) is needed. If, for example, 
the consumer does not carry a payment card or the merchant does not accept it, the payment 
does not take place.18 
In case of card payments, a joint venture allows getting both sides of the market “on board”, 
by defining pricing conditions and offering a wide range of services. However, these 
conditions differ according to the specific type of card payment, three- party or four- party.19 
More precisely, in the case of three-party systems (usually only for credit) there are three 
parties participating in the transaction: the consumer, the merchant and the card company. 
This implies that the platform has, at the same time, the role of acquirer and issuer, 
considering that it receives the information on the amount of the transaction and the one 
related to the consumer card. Therefore, the funds flow directly into the merchant account as 
soon as the transaction is authorised. Nevertheless, in order to receive the service, the 
merchant has to pay a fee which is set by the payment platform and which is a certain 
percentage of the purchase amount.20 
On the other hand, in four-party systems (both for credit and for debit), there are four parties 
involved in a card transaction: the consumer, the bank that issued the card (the issuer), the 
merchant and the bank that deals with the merchant (the acquirer). 
The first author who described how the card payment system works was W.F. Baxter in 
1983,21 who based his analysis on the assumption that there is perfect competition between 
banks and homogeneity of customers and merchants: assuming that the price of the good 
that the cardholder wishes to buy is p, usually he pays, in addition to p, a fraction of the card 
fee, f. However, in many cases, he pays a fixed fee annually or quarterly which could be 
considered a small fee per transaction. The function of this f is to ensure that the issuer can 
cover its transaction costs. Subsequently, the issuing bank pays the bank of the merchant the 
retail price minus an amount a of the transaction value. This amount constitutes the 
interchange fee. 
The merchant receives from his bank the price p minus a transaction amount, m, which is the 
merchant fee (also called merchant service charge) which usually encompasses the 
                                                     
16 T. J. Muris (2005), “Payment Card Regulation and the (Mis)Application of the Economics of Two-
Sided Markets”, Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. 3, p. 517. 
17 D.S. Evans and R. Schmalensee (2005), Paying with Plastic: the Digital Revolution in Buying and 
Borrowing, 2nd ed., Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 133. 
18 D.S. Evans (2003), “The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets”, Yale Journal on Regulation, Vol. 
20, II, p. 359. 
19 A. Heimler (2010), “Payment Cards Pricing Patterns: the Role of Antitrust and Regulatory 
Authorities”, (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1574292).  
20 B. Klein, A.V. Lerner, K.M. Murphy and L.L. Plache (2006), “Competition in Two-Sided Markets: the 
Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Interchange Fees“, Antitrust L.J., Vol. 73, III, p. 572. 
21 W.F. Baxter (1983), “Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives”, 
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, III, p. 541. See also A. Frankel and A. Shampine (2006), ”The 
Economic Effects of Interchange Fees“, Antitrust L.J., Vol. 73, III, p. 630; J.S. Gans and S.P. King (2003), 
“The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems”, Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy, Vol. 
3, I. 
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interchange fee paid to the issuer. Through the merchant fee, the acquirer covers also its part 
of transaction costs. Should the acquirer pass through the interchange fee, the merchant 
service charges will be higher. However the merchant also has the opportunity to pass 
through his fee to consumers. As a result, he will ask for higher prices when the payment is 
made by card rather than by cash or cheque. Another option available to the merchant is to 
set higher prices for all the products he sells. In this case, all the consumers, not only those 
who pay by card, will contribute to covering the costs incurred by the merchant because of 
card transactions. 
In most cases, the interchange fee is set not by banks individually but by payment brands. As 
regards the two-sidedness of the market, these payment brands, in setting the interchange 
fee, face a trade-off between promoting the use of the cards and merchants’ acceptance.22 A 
low interchange fee tends to favour the acquiring side of the payment system. In contrast, a 
high interchange fee encourages consumers to hold and use cards for their transactions, 
especially when it is associated with a low annual or quarterly card fee. 
2.2 In Favour and Against Interchange Fees as Regards the Economic 
Debate 
There are two main arguments in favour of interchange fees in the payment card system. The 
first one relates to the role of the interchange fee in ensuring compensation for the costs 
incurred by the issuer when offering the service. The second one focuses on the two-sided 
aspect of the market. 
As for the first argument, there are three different kinds of services that are offered by the 
issuer, which generate three kinds of costs: “general service costs”, which cover costs such as 
that of processing transactions; “costs for a payment guarantee”, under which the issuing 
bank agrees to honour all payments which derive from a “fraudulent use of credit cards” or 
“from bad debt write-off”; and “costs for an interest-free funding period”, coming from the 
fact that the price is debited to the cardholder’s account after a certain period of time and not 
immediately after the authorisation of the transaction.23 Since it is the merchant who must 
initiate the electronic payment, the issuer needs to be compensated for its costs and the 
interchange fee would be the best instrument to produce such compensation.24 
The second main argument in favour of interchange fee concerns the two-sidedness of the 
market. As already said in the previous paragraph, the credit card market is an example of a 
two-sided market given that in order to carry out a transaction both sides of the market (the 
consumers on the one side and the merchants on the other) have to be involved. This 
characteristic of the market means that, in addition to the problem of the “price level”, the 
main difficulty is to determine the ‘optimal price structure’ of the two sides and, therefore, 
which part of the transaction cost should be paid by consumers or merchants. The 
interchange fee is claimed to be an unavoidable tool to influence this allocation and to affect 
                                                     
22 J. Wright (2004),”The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems”, Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol. 52, No. 1, p. 3. 
23 J. Freigang and A. Grün (2005), “The Assessment of Domestic Credit Card Interchange Fees Under 
EC Competition Law”, European Business Law Review, Vol. 16, p. 153. 
24 Muris, op. cit., p. 523. Against this argument, it has been argued that it is the cardholder who 
initiates the transaction and so he should pay the costs related to it. This could be done through higher 
transaction fees or annual card fees: A.S. Frankel (2007), “Towards a Competitive Card Payments 
Marketplace”, Proceedings of Payments System Review Conference, RBA, Sydney, November, p. 33. 
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the cardholder fee and the merchant service charge, and consequently the volume of 
transactions.25 
Network effects play a central role in two-sided markets. As a matter of fact, if there are 
numerous merchants who accept a card brand, then consequently this card brand becomes 
more valuable to consumers. At the same time, the more consumers hold the card, the larger 
the benefits to the merchants.26 Due to the existence of these network effects, the interchange 
fee shifts the costs of the transaction from cardholders to merchants and makes the card 
payment more attractive, thus contributing to an expansion of the network which is 
beneficial to both sides.27 
Three main arguments have been raised against interchange fees. 
First of all, it is maintained that the main reason why interchange fees are not passed 
through cardholders is because of the market power of the issuing banks.28 This is because 
issuing banks and acquiring banks are not perfectly competitive. Given these imperfections, 
the effective economic role of interchange fees depends on whether the acquirer passes 
through the interchange fee to the merchant (and the latter to cardholders) and, more 
importantly, whether the issuer transfers the benefits related to the collection of interchange 
fees to the consumers through a lower annual card fee. The point is that, on the one hand, 
merchants do not usually demand a higher price only from those consumers which prefer 
card payment. As a result, when the level of interchange fee increases, the higher costs of the 
card transaction are transferred to all the consumers without taking into account the 
                                                     
25 Guadamillas, op. cit., p. 194. In this study it is clearly stated that, because of the asymmetry between 
the two sides of the market, it may be socially efficient to have a balancing act that reallocates the costs 
between merchants and customers, even if this implies that one side of the market - in this case 
retailers - pays more than the other. This is mainly because banks have to recoup fixed costs needed to 
maintain safe and efficient infrastructures. However, as discussed infra, empirical findings in the 
European retail banking sector demonstrate that, even without an interchange fee, banks would still 
make profits and that there is not a negative relationship between the average fee per card and the 
level of interchange fee, that is to say that an increase in interchange fees is not fully offset by 
reductions in cardholder fees. This finding may raise doubts about the two-sided market argument. 
See, also, D.S. Evans and R. Schmalensee (2005), “The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their 
Regulation: An Overview”, 4548-05 MIT Sloan Working Paper, MIT, Cambridge, May, p. 12; Evans 
and Schmalensee, op. cit., pp. 300-310. 
26 R. Schmalensee (2002), “Payment Systems and Interchange Fees”, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 
50, II, pp. 103-105. 
27 In respect to this second argument, it has been argued that whilst having a temporary interchange 
fee would lead to the expansion of a new network, this function of the interchange fee might not be 
needed in a developed network. See M. Katz (2001), “Network Effects, Interchange Fees and no 
Surcharge Rules in the Australian Credit and Charge Cards Industry”, RBA, Sydney, p. 27; S. 
Semeraro (2007), “Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of Antitrust Uncertainty”, Thomas 
Jefferson School of Law - Legal Research Paper Series, March, p. 36. 
28 A.S. Frankel (1998), “Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and Exchange of Money”, Antitrust L.J., 
Vol. 66, II, pp. 341-346; D.W. Carlton and A.S. Frankel (2005), “Transaction Costs, Externalities, and 
“Two-Sided” Payment Markets”, Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. 3, pp. 633-638; M. Katz (2005), 
“What Do We Know About Interchange Fees and What Does It Mean for Public Policy?: Commentary 
on Evans and Schmalensee”, Proceedings - Payments System Research Conferences, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, p. 127. Contra Klein, Lerner, Murphy and Plache, op. cit., pp. 594-
609; H. Chang and D.S. Evans (2000), “The Competitive Effects of the Collective Setting of Interchange 
Fees by Payment Card Systems”, Antitrust Bull., N. 45, p. 664. 
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payment system they chose.29 On the other hand, the issuing banks “do not fully rebate each 
increment in interchange fee revenue back to their cardholders”.30 From this perspective, the 
interchange fee can be considered a means to make profits for the issuers.  
Related to this issue is the fact that interchange fees are collectively set by banks, so that they 
can be considered an example of horizontal agreements. Considering the fact that a high 
level of interchange fee is attractive for both issuing and acquiring banks, they are induced to 
agree on excessively high interchange fees.31 Moreover, most banks are both issuers and 
acquirers: in acquiring transactions they do not make losses, while as issuing banks they 
make profits. 
Another risk lies in the fact that, because of the intensified competition for issuers, when 
there is a rise in the level of interchange fees the issuing banks tend to offer the cardholders a 
series of advantages and rebates that make the use of such instrument of payment more 
attractive than other forms of payment. At the same time, payment brands tend to increase 
the level of interchange fee with the aim to attract more and more banks, whereas banks do 
not have any interest in encouraging the use of the lower fee cards, despite of the efficiencies 
associated with them.32 
Because of ‘price coherence’ and market power exercised by banks, some payment methods 
(namely, card payment) drive out others (namely, cash and cheques). This is known as the 
‘Gresham’s law’.33 
2.3 A socially optimal determination of MIF? And what about ancillary 
restraints? 
To complete the analysis, and within the framework of the self-regulatory initiative leading 
to the creation of SEPA, it could be useful to investigate some possible alternatives to a high 
fall-back MIF. 
Three options are usually mentioned in economic literature.34 
A possible solution, known as “par collection”, would be to set MIF equal to zero.35 In this 
scenario, there is no need for negotiations between the parties because the transactions are 
processed automatically and “the clearing and settlement of interbank payment claims” 
occurs “at the face amount of the claim”.36 Instead of reaching an agreement on the level of 
the fee that has to be paid from one side of the transaction to the other, issuing and acquiring 
                                                     
29 J.C. Rochet and J. Tirole (2006), “Externalities and Regulation in Card Payment Systems”, Review of 
Network Economics, Vol. 5. I, p. 4; Frankel, op. cit., p. 346. In response to all the criticisms to interchange 
fees made by A. Frankel, see Chang and Evans, op. cit., pp. 662-677. 
30 Frankel and Shampine, op. cit., p. 634.  
31 D.A. Balto (2000), “The Problem of Interchange Fees: Costs Without Benefits?”, ECLR, Vol. 21, p. 
216. 
32 Frankel and Shampine, op. cit., p. 637. 
33 Sir Thomas Gresham was the financial adviser of Queen Elisabeth I. Gresham’s source of concern 
was the recognition of the same value to different coins irrespective of the preciousness of the metals 
contained. See Frankel, op. cit., pp. 317-318. Contra Chang and Evans, op. cit., pp. 669-677. 
34 R. Schmalensee (2003), “Interchange Fees: a Review of the Literature”, Payment Card Economics 
Review, Vol. 1, p. 43. 
35 Contra Klein, Lerner, Murphy and Plache, op. cit., pp. 576-577; Chang and Evans, op. cit., pp. 665-
666.  
36 Frankel and Shampine, op. cit., p. 637. 
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banks would just impose on their respective customers the charges which reflect the costs 
borne for the services they offer. 
The second option would be to make the bilateral negotiations between banks on the level of 
interchange fee as mandatory. In such a situation, there would be again a contract between 
acquiring and issuing banks and an interchange fee ensuring that the transaction occurs. The 
main criticism against this system has been that it would lead to a “web of millions of 
contracts connecting each bank with every other bank”37 thus resulting in an extremely 
costly system. However, in other circumstances, banks have shown that they are able to find 
some alternatives to bilateral agreements, for example allowing the transactions’ data of 
small banks to be processed through larger ones. In this case, only roughly one hundred 
contracts should be concluded rather than millions.38 Another criticism to this second option 
is that the issuing banks are likely to have considerable bargaining power by worsening the 
alternatives of the other party. This is because of the honour all cards rule, according to 
which a merchant that accepts to carry a payment brand is obliged to accept all cards issued 
by the banks which are in the same association. 
Another possibility would be to give the banks in the network discretion to decide whether 
they wish to sign contracts with each other. Nonetheless, it could be argued that some 
payments would become impossible since there is no contract between the issuing and the 
acquiring banks.39 
In addition, MIF are often combined with ancillary clauses, such as the no surcharge rule, the 
no steering rule and the honour all cards rule. These further price restraints imposed on 
merchants by network rules are considered to be also anti-competitive because they reduce 
the retailers’ freedom to price discriminate. They also need to be considered together with 
MIF because their combined application might reinforce anti-competitive effects. 
In order to maximise the use of cards by customers, card networks have prohibited 
merchants from price discriminating on the basis of the chosen means of payment (no 
discrimination rule) and from surcharging customers who use cards or offering discounts to 
customers using low-cost payment systems such as cash or cheque. As a result, prices 
usually do not vary according to the payment instrument customers choose even if actually 
the costs that merchants (and other customers) have to bear are much higher in case of cards.  
According to some scholars, the no discrimination rule leads customers to have “inappropriate 
incentives”40 to choose the costliest payment system. As a matter of fact, the lack of 
differentiation between prices according to the payment instrument means that customers 
consider only their own benefits associated with card spending (such as the interest-free 
funding period or the frequent flyer miles). Given that these rewards are earned almost for 
free by card holders (because the retailers and partly all other final customers pay for them), 
they have an incentive to choose this costly system. Consequently, the elimination of this 
network rule would reduce free riding: merchants would pass through the merchant fees to 
cardholders; cardholders would become more aware of the interchange fees charged by card 
                                                     
37 Baxter, op. cit., p. 556. 
38 Frankel and  Shampine, op. cit., pp. 640-641.  
39 Ibid., p. 642. 
40 A. Heimler and S.F. Ennis (2008), “Competition and Efficiency in Payment Cards Which Options for 
SEPA?”, W. Comp., Vol. 31, I, p. 20. 
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brands; customers would choose less costly means of payment or they would opt for card 
schemes setting low interchange fees.41 
Price coherence has been challenged by many competition authorities and regulators. 
However, even after the elimination of the no surcharge rule in some countries, only a very 
small percentage of merchants have started to offer different prices reflecting the relative 
costs of the payment instrument used by customers.42 This does not mean that the 
elimination of this anticompetitive network rule is without effect,43 as the Australian case 
that we will discuss below shows: the number of Australian merchants surcharging credit 
card transactions has risen over recent years, possibly as an effect of such prohibition.44 
Merchants are also not allowed to induce customers to use certain types of payment 
instruments rather than others (no steering rule). This rule, in addition to the no surcharge 
rule, ensures that there is price coherence among payment instruments/systems.45 In light of 
the lack of any efficiency justifications for these rules, many believe that they should be 
eliminated. 
Finally, another network rule is the honour all cards rule, which requires retailers to accept 
all cards - both credit and debit - issued by a payment card network once they have decided 
to join that network. While at the beginning, this rule applied only to credit cards, when 
credit cards brands started issuing debit cards, this was extended to debit cards.46 The 
overall consequence of this situation is that banks tend to direct customers towards card 
programs with high interchange fees. On the other hand, merchants can decide either to 
accept all the cards issued by the brand or not accept them at all - so they must make an “all 
or nothing choice”.47 
2.4 Empirical Findings in the European Retail Banking Sector  
As mentioned, according to Baxter’s analysis, banks in retail payment services do not have 
market power against customers and merchants.48 As a result, interchange fees are passed 
through without generating any kind of profit for banks. However, Baxter’s theory assumes 
a perfect competition exists between banks and homogeneity of customers and merchants, 
has been rejected in the mentioned 2007 sector inquiry into retail banking by the European 
Commission.49 
One of the most interesting findings of the Commission is indeed that in Europe the 
acquiring side of the market is much more concentrated than the issuing one.50 In some 
Member States, it emerges that there is only one acquiring party which has strong market 
power and, therefore, is able to pass on the interchange fees to merchants.51 Moreover, in 
                                                     
41 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
42 Chang, Evans and Garcia Swartz, op. cit., p. 19; Evans and Schmalensee, op. cit., p. 27. 
43 Heimler and Ennis, op. cit., p. 25. 
44 RBA (2007), Reform of Australia’s Payments System: Issues for the 2007/08 Review, Sydney, p. 14. 
45 Frankel, op. cit., pp. 52-54. 
46 Heimler and Ennis, op. cit., p. 26. 
47 Frankel, op. cit., p. 55. 
48 Baxter, op. cit., p. 542. 
49 European Commission, op. cit., p. 87. 
50 Ibid., pp. 88-90. 
51 See also NMa (2005), Monitor Financiële Sector, The Hague, p. 34. 
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these countries, the only acquirer in the market is likely to carry out negotiations and reach 
agreements on behalf of the banks. This high market concentration on the acquiring side of 
the industry, together with a high level of profitability and the existence of entry barriers, 
raise many concerns because of the ability of banks to exercise market power. 
Furthermore, according to economic theory, the level of card fees should be lower and the 
merchant service charges higher when interchange fees increase. This would happen because 
of the interchange fee mechanism itself: in case no interchange fee is paid by the acquirer to 
the issuer, the latter would have to recoup all the costs from cardholders, thus increasing the 
card fees when the interchange fee is higher and lowering them when the interchange fee 
decreases. This hypothesis is confirmed by the existence of a negative relationship between 
the average fee per card and the level of interchange fee in a given country or network. 
However, contrary to what economic theory suggests, the Commission sector inquiry reveals 
that there is no negative relationship between the level of interchange fees and the fees paid 
by cardholders. From an econometric estimation in the inquiry, it emerges that 
approximately only 25% of the interchange fee is passed onto cardholders. The remaining 
75% is retained by banks as a profit.  
This striking finding may indeed cast some doubts on the relevance of the two-sided market 
argument as regards the role played by the interchange fee in this industry: challenging the 
hypothesis advanced by some industry participants and the economic literature that an 
increase in interchange fees is fully offset by reductions in cardholder fees, the results of the 
econometric estimation by the Commission rather suggest that “if issuers do not pass return 
the additional interchange fee revenues back to cardholders this implies that interchange fees 
are a way to transfer profits to the side of the scheme where they are least likely to be 
competed away”.52 
The report gives also empirical evidence of a relationship between the interchange fees for 
credit card payment and the level of profitability of the issuing banks. In particular, 
comparing the total income including the interchange fee revenues and the total income in 
the absence of the interchange fee revenues, the Commission concludes that even without 
the interchange fee revenues - so, even in the case of ‘par’ clearing – the institutions 
considered in the inquiry would still realise profits.53 This would seem to weaken the 
argument put forward by the operators in the market, according to whom, interchange fees 
are a necessary condition to recover the costs borne by the issuing banks. 
Thus, from the Commission sector inquiry, it would appear that, even if there could be some 
reasons for implementing an interchange fee, in practice the main effect is that it leads to 
extremely high profits for banks, especially the issuers. The Commission explicitly mentions 
that the aim of the report is not to take a position in favour of an interchange fee equal to 
zero for all networks, but that the levels in Europe are probably not optimal. Nevertheless, a 
zero interchange fee seems to be the solution that would better correspond to the 
Commission’s conclusions, as this would be likely to increase competition not only between 
the issuers but also between the acquirers. Given that each issuer and acquirer would charge 
its customers according to the costs they bear, the issuer had a strong incentive to offer cards 
which are attractive for customers and which would not involve the payment of high fees. 
On the acquiring side, banks would face much lower fees as they would not have to pay an 
interchange fee for every transaction.54 
                                                     
52 European Commission, op. cit., p. 100. 
53 Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
54 Heimler, op. cit. 
12  MALAGUTI & GUERRIERI 
 
These various – and sometimes conflicting – findings on and evaluations of MIF, have to be 
analysed from a competition case law standpoint. 
3. Competition Policy and Interchange Fees  
3.1 At the EU Level 
All over the world, competition authorities and competition tribunals have scrutinised the 
use of MIF. The main competition concern is that, by collectively and centrally55 setting MIF, 
the involved banks set a floor on the merchant fee that makes it difficult to agree bilaterally 
on a lower fee. In the European Union, these agreements may conflict with Article 101(1) 
TFEU because a minimum price would be fixed indirectly. 
As already briefly mentioned in the introduction, there are in particular two streams of 
decisions taken by the European Commission in relation to MIF in the payment card 
industry: addressing the schemes of VISA, on the one side, and MasterCard, on the other.56 
In the Visa II decision, the Commission took the view that MIF is an agreement on price 
which is caught by Article 101(1) TFEU and which restricts competition by effect, but it 
granted an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, provided that Visa reduced the level of 
MIF. 
In the first place, as regards the relevant market the Commission considered that both sides 
of the market (the acquiring and the issuing side) have to be taken into consideration.57  
In the second place, two main anti-competitive concerns were identified. Firstly, MIF 
agreements, by restricting the freedom of member banks to set the level of MIF which best 
suits their own commercial or pricing strategy, restrict competition by effect. The agreement 
therefore fixes a de facto floor and affects price competition in the market for card issuing and 
merchant acquiring. Secondly, the Commission found that there was an upward pressure on 
the level of MIF, and the chance for merchants to cease accepting Visa if the MIF were too 
high was not found to be sufficiently strong to constrain this upward pressure. As a matter 
of fact, when the level of MIF goes up, it would appear that merchants prefer to recover this 
increase in their costs by raising the price for all goods. 
At the same time, the Commission accepted a number of efficiency justifications for MIF.58 
Generally speaking, in order to benefit from the exemption under Article 101(1) TFEU, an 
agreement must satisfy four conditions: it must improve the production or distribution of 
goods or promote technical or economic progress; consumers must receive a fair share of the 
resulting benefit; the agreement does not have to contain restrictions which are dispensable; 
                                                     
55 L. Repa, A. Malczewska, A. C. Teixeira and E. Martinez Rivero (2008), “Commission Prohibits 
MasterCard’s Multilateral Interchange Fees for Cross-Border Card Payments in the EEA”, Competition 
Policy Newsletter, Vol. 1, p. 1. 
56 On the policy developed by the Commission on MIF see also S. Ryan, E. Martinez Rivero, A. 
Nijenhuis (2007), ”Financial Services”, in  J. Faull and A. Nikpay, The EC Law of Competition, 2nd 
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 1305. 
57 For an explanation of the anticompetitive effects of MIF agreements, see J. Freigang and A. Grün 
(2005), “The Assessment of Domestic Credit Card Interchange Fees under EC Competition Law”, 
European Business Law Review, Vol. 16, p. 158. 
58 J.C. Rochet (2009), “Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems: Price Remedies in a Two-Sided 
Market” in B. Lyons (ed.), Cases in European Competition Policy: the Economic Analysis, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
MULTILATERAL INTERCHANGE FEES  13 
and it does not have to substantially eliminate competition.59 The Commission identified two 
efficiency justifications in respect of MIF applied by VISA. On the one hand, it was accepted 
that a MIF could lead to efficiency gains, compared to bilateral agreements, due to lower 
negotiation and transaction costs. On the other, the Commission acknowledged that, because 
of the existence of network externalities in a payment card system, interchange fees could 
provide greater utility for both merchants and cardholders. The consequent balancing 
between the efficiencies and consumer benefits that an agreement may generate against the 
restrictions of competition that such agreement may cause,60 led to the conclusion that the 
former outweighed the latter. As a result, the agreement was exempted.61  
In the following MasterCard decision, almost all efficiency claims accepted in Visa II were 
rejected.62 First of all, the Commission did not accept the argument that MIF per se enhance 
efficiency of the payment card system, arguing that “there is no presumption that MIF in 
general enhance the efficiency of card schemes just as there is no presumption that they do 
not fulfil the conditions of art. 81(3) of the Treaty and are therefore illegal”,63 since 
MasterCard had failed to prove that the efficiencies outweighed the negative effects of the 
restrictions of competition. More specifically, as to the condition of a fair share of benefit to 
consumers, the Commission held that not all customers benefited from MIF and the 
efficiencies on the issuing side of the market that receives the interchange fee do not offset 
the negative effects on merchants. Regarding the indispensability condition, the Commission 
considered that MasterCard “had not proven that its current MIF is indeed indispensable to 
maximise system output and to achieve any related objective efficiencies”,64 citing the ECB 
statistics on payment card schemes in the European Payment Area that have been operating 
without MIF.65  
These conclusions were partly the result of the fact that in MasterCard, the Commission 
considered that the relevant market for the assessment of the effects of MIF was only the 
acquiring one. Focusing the antitrust scrutiny on the merchant side, the Commission found 
                                                     
59 P. Nicolaides (2005),”The Balancing Myth: the Economics of Article 81(1) & (3)”, Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 134. 
60 According to Nicolaides, Article 101(3) implies the application of “successive filters” more than a real 
balancing. In Nicolaides, op. cit., pp. 142-143. 
61 Freigang and Grün, op. cit., p. 163. 
62 L. Vitzilaiou (2008), “MIF: The Root of Evil or Just a Scapegoat?”, GCP, Vol. 2, p. 5. 
63 Commission Decision of 19.12.2007, MasterCard, cit., § 730. 
64 Ibid., § 751. 
65 Another interesting, although more technical aspect of the Commission’s analysis is that it did not 
accept MasterCard’s argument pursuant to which, after the Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the holding 
company MasterCard Incorporated, MIF could no longer be considered a decision taken by an 
association of undertakings within the meaning of Article 101(1). As a matter of fact, the Commission 
found that, despite the changes brought about by the IPO, MasterCard remained an association of 
undertakings whose members were banks that still had to comply with network rules and were 
bound to follow MIF as set by the brand. That is to say that, after the restructuring, MasterCard 
Incorporated vertically obliges directly each member bank to apply the default interchange fee it 
decided, whereas horizontal agreements between participating banks are removed. In the end, 
according to the Commission, nothing changes substantially and Article 101(1) still applies. See V. 
Fleischer (2007), “The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand”, Harvard Negotiation Law 
Review, Vol. 12, pp. 144-154. In 2008, Visa had the largest IPO of equity in U.S. history. In J.D. Wright 
(2006), “MasterCard’s Single Entity Strategy”, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol. 12, p. 227; W. Bolt 
and S. Chakravorti (2008), “Economics of Payment Cards: A Status Report“, DNB Working Papers, The 
Hague, p. 1. 
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little difficulty in concluding that the efficiencies that MIF could generate did not 
counterbalance the restrictions on competition. Finally, the decision seems to leave open the 
possibility that agreements on MIF could be deemed anti-competitive by object. This is 
another evidence of a more formalistic approach adopted by the Commission in its most 
recent decisions.66  
On 1 March 2008, MasterCard appealed the decision to the General Court which issued its 
judgement on the case on 24 May 2012.67 The Court dismissed the action brought by the card 
brand and fully upheld the Commission’s decision.  
First of all, the Court stated that MIF are not necessary to the working of the network: “the 
requirement for objective necessity cannot be interpreted as implying a need to weigh the 
pro and anti-competitive effects of an agreement. Such an analysis can take place only in the 
specific framework of Article [101](3) EC”.68 It then added that MIF are not objectively 
necessary for the operation of four-party payment schemes for two reasons. On the one 
hand, there are other default settlement mechanisms less restrictive of competition than the 
MIF, such as the prohibition on “ex-post pricing”.69 On the other hand, MIF are not a 
necessary mechanism for transferring funds to the issuing banks, which already receive 
significant revenues from cards. It is thus unlikely that if the MIF did not exist, issuers would 
stop their business. This conclusion was reinforced by the Australian case we will  discuss 
below, where a significant reduction in MIF levels did not impact the system’s viability.  
In the second place, the Court seemed to point to the existence of a restriction of competition 
by object given that “Article [101](1)(a) EC expressly provides that measures which directly 
or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices constitute restrictions of competition, and that, 
according to the case-law, the purpose of Article [101](1)(a) EC is to prohibit undertakings 
from distorting the normal formation of prices on the markets”.70 However, it based its 
analysis on the MIF restrictive effects and acknowledged that MIF set a de facto floor for the 
merchant service fees and that they limit the pressure which merchants can exert on 
acquirers by reducing their possibility to negotiate a price which is below a certain threshold.  
In the third place, the Court considered that MasterCard had not proven the existence of 
efficiencies brought by MIF and that could offset the harm of the restriction. Precisely, after 
having confirmed the Commission’s analysis, focused only on those efficiencies arising 
specifically from the MIF and not from the MasterCard payment system as a whole, the 
Court held that the fact that the MIF could contribute to increasing the system output is not 
                                                     
66 Repa, Malczewska, Teixeira and Martinez Rivero, op. cit., p. 2. 
67 General Court, judgment of 24.5.2012, case T-111/08, MasterCard, Inc. and Others v. European 
Commission, not yet reported. For comments related to the judgement, see E. Chiti and S. Screpanti 
(2012), “Osservatorio della Corte e del Tribunale dell’Unione Europea”, Giornale di diritto 
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68 General Court, judgment of 24.5.2012,  case T-111/08, cit., § 80.  
69 Ibid., §§ 95-95. If ex-post pricing is prohibited, any interchange fee must be agreed between the 
issuing and the acquiring banks before the transaction takes place.  
70 Ibid., § 140. See also General Court, judgment of 10.3.1992, case T-13/89, Imperial Chemical Industries 
plc v. Commission, [1992] ECR II-01021, § 311.  
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sufficient to conclude that the first condition set out in Article 101(3) is satisfied. This is 
because, while the primary beneficiaries of a greater use of MasterCard system are the 
participating banks, the second condition of Article 101(3) requires the existence of 
appreciable objective advantages in regard to merchants, as one of the two user groups 
affected by payment cards. Moreover, in the Court’s view, MasterCard did not provide 
empirical evidence to support its argument that the MIF give rise to efficiencies. From this 
point of view, it interestingly clarified that, in light of Article 2 of Regulation No. 1/2003, it is 
the Commission’s burden to prove that the agreement restricts competition, and on the 
undertaking concerned to prove that all the conditions to benefit from the exception are 
fulfilled. As a result, the “lack of data capable of meeting the standard of economic proof 
demanded by the Commission” cannot mean that “the burden of proof” on MasterCard under 
Article 101(3) “is eased, or even reversed”.71 In other words, given the difficulty in finding 
evidence of the benefits which merchants can obtain from a greater diffusion of the system, 
the Court considered that risks of anti-competitive harms stemming from MIF setting offset 
possible benefits. As for peculiarities deriving from the two-sidedness of the market, the 
Court first ruled that “the appreciable objective advantages to which the first condition of 
Article 81(3) EC relates may arise not only for the relevant market but also for every other 
market on which the agreement in question might have beneficial effects”.72 However, it 
eventually rejected the appellant’s argument regarding the Commission’s failure in assessing 
the benefits that cardholders obtain from the MIF, by stating that the lack of proven 
efficiencies on the merchants’ side, which are one of the two customer groups, makes it 
unnecessary to verify whether some objective advantages attributable to the MIF benefited 
cardholders.73 
On 31 December 2007, the VISA exemption expired and on 3 April 2009 the Commission sent 
Visa a statement of objections74 containing a competition assessment on MIF similar to the 
assessment made in the then recently taken MasterCard’s decision. In addition, the statement 
of objections addressed also some network rules such as the honour all cards rule, and the no 
surcharge rule. Given that Visa Europe offered commitments that were in line with 
MasterCard’s decision for debit card payments75, the European Commission accepted them 
and closed part of the investigation through a commitment decision under Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2003 (Visa III decision).76 Subsequently, new proceedings were opened 
                                                     
71 Ibid., § 232.  
72 Ibid., § 228. See also General Court, judgments of 28.2.2002, case T-86/95, Compagnie générale 
maritime and Others v Commission, [2002] ECR II-1011, § 343 and of 27.9.2006, case T-168/01, 
GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission, [2006] ECR II-2969, § 248. 
73 Finally, the Court endorsed the Commission’s view that, even after the IPO, MasterCard remained 
“an institutionalized form of coordination of the conduct of the banks” (§ 259). The Court pointed out, on the 
one hand, that MasterCard continued to be an association of undertakings due to the fact that banks 
were not only customers but participated in essential decisions regarding the MasterCard system. On 
the other hand, it ruled that both the card brand and the participating banks had a common interest in 
high fees. 
74 European Commission (2009), “Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Visa”, Press 
Release MEMO/09/151, 26.4.2009. 
75 The fee reduction offered by Visa was in line with MasterCard’s decision to cut cross-border MIFs in 
order to comply with 2007 Commission decision. See, infra, § 3.4. 
76 Commission Decision of 8.12.2010, Visa MIF, [2010] COMP/39.398. See European Commission 
(2010), “Antitrust: Commission Makes Visa Europe’s Commitments to Cut Interbank Fees for Debit 
Cards Legally Binding”, Press Release IP/10/1684, 8.12.2010. It is important to underline that this is 
the first Commission decision to formally acknowledge the Merchant Indifference Test (MIT) as a 
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addressing possible anti-competitive effects caused by consumer credit MIF. In this 
framework, the Commission sent Visa a supplementary statement of objections regarding 
MIF for credit cards and related practices.77 The Commission was concerned over certain 
practices of the payment company, specifically in regards to rules on ‘cross-border 
acquiring’, which limit cross-border competition and segment the internal market insofar as 
they oblige banks to apply the inter-bank fees of the country of the transaction. Additionally, 
the Commission looked into interchange fees set and applied by Visa for transactions with 
consumer credit cards. Subsequently, Visa proposed commitments to cut its inter-bank fees 
for credit card payments to a level of 0.3% of the value of the transaction for cross-border and 
domestic transactions and to reform its system in such a way that cross-border competition is 
facilitated.78 Pursuant to Article 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission published a 
“market test notice’ inviting the interested parties to send their comments.  
The story does not seem to have ended for MasterCard either: on 9 April 2013, the 
Commission opened a new formal investigation against MasterCard in relation to the credit 
card company’s inter-bank fees and other practices.79 Specifically, and similarly to VISA, in 
the Commission’s view, a violation of Article 101(1) is likely to have arisen? from: (i) rules on 
cross-border acquiring and related business rules such as the honour all cards rule; and (ii) 
inter-bank fees in relation to payments made by cardholders who are not from the European 
Economic Area.  
Whilst awaiting for new developments, at this stage, it can be concluded that there has been 
a clear trend towards more severity in the Commission’s analysis (as upheld by the General 
Court): after MasterCard, even though the possibility that MIF agreements can be exempted 
under Article 101(3) is not excluded a priori,80 as a matter of fact, it is not the level of MIF but 
rather their existence which seems to constitute a competition concern.81 More specifically, 
the Commission clearly held that networks can continue using MIF only when it is bilaterally 
agreed between individual issuers and acquirers. In the absence of bilateral agreements, 
transactions should be cleared “at par”.82 
                                                                                                                                                                     
benchmark to verify whether conditions under Article 101(3) are satisfied. For the sake of precision, 
the decision is without prejudice to the right of the Commission to initiate proceedings against Visa 
Europe into credit card transactions and network rules. 
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79 European Commission (2013), “Antitrust: Commission Opens Investigation Into MasterCard 
Inter-Bank Fees”, Press Release IP/13/314, 9.4.2013.  
80 European Commission (2008), “Antitrust: Commission Notes MasterCard’s Decision to 
Temporarily Repeal Its Cross-Border Multilateral Interchange Fees within the EEA”, Press 
Release MEMO/08/397, 12.6.2008. 
81 L. Ceccarelli (2008), “Commissione Europea vs MasterCard: l’Analisi Antitrust di un Mercato 
Bilaterale”, Mercato concorrenza regole, Vol. 3, pp. 607-608. 
82 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the Commission’s view on this point was 
indirectly expressed in the Mastercard decision (see footnote No. 517 where it stated that: “[I]n 
the Commission's view in the absence of a default MIF banks may or may not enter into bilateral 
agreements on interchange fees. The existence of such bilaterally agreed interchange fees is no 
pre-requisite for the viability of the MasterCard payment card scheme. In the absence of a 
default MIF prices are established on both sides of the MasterCard scheme as set out in section 
7.3.4.1, i.e.: each bank determines its service levels and prices in a manner that maximises its 
individual profits”).  
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3.2 At the National Level within the EU 
MIF were scrutinised also by several national competition authorities which, according to 
Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003,83 have to apply EU competition law when agreements have a 
Community dimension,84 while, at the same time, have to cooperate and coordinate with the 
Commission in order to ensure a consistent application of the legal framework in the 
analysis of MIF. 
In April 2005, the Spanish Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia (hereinafter, TDC)85 
adopted an approach stricter than that used in the Visa II decision when three card schemes 
(Sistema 4 B, Servired and Euro 6000) applied for individual exemptions of their domestic 
interchange fee. The TDC, on the one hand, did not accept the two-sided market argument, 
taking the view that interchange fees constitute a restriction of competition under Article 
101(1) that could be justified only on the grounds of efficiency considerations; on the other, it 
criticised the method of determining interchange fees arguing that it did not reflect costs.86 
One scheme - 4 B - and some merchants appealed the decision. To date, the Court has 
supported the competition authority’s decision, although it has not yet issued a final 
judgement on the appeal.87 
In September 2005, the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) came to the conclusion that88 
members of the MasterCard UK Members Forum and other MasterCard licensees in the UK 
were party to an agreement which was illegal both under Article 101(1) TFEU and the 
Chapter I prohibition in Section 2 of the national Competition Act. Even if the OFT stressed 
the similarities to the Visa II decision, it reached different conclusions on exemptability, 
arguing that collective price restrictions are not indispensable for the attainment of the 
benefits of MIF agreements89 and that they do not allow a fair share of the benefits to be 
passed onto consumers. On appeal, the decision was withdrawn by the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal. Subsequently, the authority launched an investigation into MasterCard’s and 
Visa’s UK MIF arrangements for credit and debit cards whose outcome is still pending.90 
                                                     
83 Council Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16.12.2002, on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] O.J. L. 1, 04.01.2003. 
84 Freigang and Grün, op. cit., pp. 159-161. 
85 Decisions of the TDC of 11.04.2005, N. A 314/02, Tasas Intercambio SISTEMA 4B; A 318/02, Tasas 
Intercambio SERVIRED; and N. A 287/00 Sistema Euro 6000. 
86 J. Briones (2005), “The Spanish Tribunal Rejects Bank Commissions on Credit Cards”, €-Konomica’s 
Newsletter No. 7 (http://www.e-konomica.net/_pdf/7_bank-commissions-on-credit-cards.pdf).  
87 More information can be found in the ECN Brief 01/2011, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/01_2011/brief_01_2011_short.pdf.  
88 Decision of the OFT of  06.09.2005, Investigation of the Multilateral Interchange Fees Provided for in the 
UK Domestic Rules of MasterCard UK Members Forum Limited (formerly known as MasterCard/Europay UK 
Limited), No. CA98/05/05. 
89 Ibid., § 533-540. 
90 OFT (2006), Statement Regarding Expansion of OFT Investigation into Interchange Fees, Press 
Release 97/06, London, 20.6.2006 and Id. (2007), OFT to Refocus Credit Card Interchange Fees Work, 
London, 9.2.2007. See also the pending investigation opened in order to clarify whether the interbank-
fees arrangements for UK domestic POS transactions made using MasterCard/Maestro and Visa 
consumer payment cards are agreements in violation of Article 101(1) and the corresponding national 
rules. More information on the latter proceeding is available at: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/ca98-current/interchange-
fees#.Ug_l-qv9PgV.  
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In December 2006, the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection also criticised 
the multilateral setting of fees on the ground that they would hamper the development of 
new payment systems and innovation which is explicitly prohibited by Article 101(1) (b) 
TFEU.91 As a result, the authority imposed the elimination of MasterCard’s and Visa’s MIF 
for credit and debit cards in Poland.92 MasterCard and the banks lodged an appeal with the 
Court of First Instance (the so-called “Competition and Consumer Protection Court”) which, 
in November 2008, reversed the decision, holding that the MIF did not restrict competition in 
the relevant market, i.e. the acquiring market. However, the Appellate Court, by referring to 
the Commission’s decision in MasterCard, stated on 22 April 2010 that the MIF did restrict 
competition in the acquiring market and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance, 
which will need to review its decision in light of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. The new 
proceeding before the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection, started in December 
2011, is still on-going.93 
Finally, and interestingly, in a few recent cases, national competition authorities have found 
that banks’ conduct consisting in coordinating their behaviour by setting excessive levels of 
interchange fees amounted to an abuse of the dominant position collectively held by them in 
the relevant market. 94 
                                                     
91 Decision of the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection of 29.12.2006, Decision on 
Determining the Interchange Fee in Visa and MasterCard Systems, case DDF3-580/1/01/DL/EK. 
92 For example, in November 2010 the Italian Competition Authority (hereinafter, ICA) fined 
MasterCard and eight banks for card fee practices. The Authority identified two conducts in breach of 
Article 101(1) TFEU, namely the structure and functioning of MasterCard’s network and the parallel 
network of license contracts between the scheme on the one hand, and licensees on the other. The 
Authority held that MasterCard, an association of undertakings, determines specific domestic MIF for 
Italy. Given that MasterCard members collectively set the price, MIF constitutes a restriction of 
competition by object. The second conduct, which represents the main difference from the 
Commission’s MasterCard decision, is the combination of licensing contracts between MasterCard 
and licensee banks, namely acquirers. Through these vertical agreements, the MasterCard network 
sets the MIF whish is passed on to customers. Moreover, licensees adopt additional conducts that 
enhance the negative effect of the MIF to their own benefit and to the benefit of the network. This 
effect is produced through clauses and contractual conditions with merchants such as blending (also 
on us and off us), no discrimination rules, honour all cards rule. MasterCard and the acquiring banks 
appealed the ICA’s final decision. On 11.7.2011, the Italian Court of First Instance (Tribunale 
Amministativo Regionale, TAR Lazio) upheld the Parties’ appeal and overturned the ICA’s decision. 
The ICA then appealed the TAR decision to the appellate administrative Court (Consiglio di Stato). 
The proceeding is still pending.  
For an analysis of the credit card network industry in Italy and interchange fees, although prior to 
these most recent developments, see G. Ardizzi (2003), “Cost Efficiency in the Retail Payment 
Networks: First Evidence from the Italian Credit Card System”, Banca d’Italia - Collana Temi di 
discussione del Servizio studi, Rome. 
93 More information is available at: http://www.uokik.gov.pl/news.php?news_id=2045.  
94 See the decision handed down by the Austrian Federal Competition Authority of 12.9.2007, Europay 
Austria Zahlungsverkehrssysteme GmbH, case 16Ok4/07, where it was ascertained that Europay Austria 
and its shareholding banks, by charging high debit card interchange fees to competitors for using 
Europay POS-terminals, had concluded an agreement the object of which was contrary to the national 
competition act and had abused their dominant position. The fine imposed by the decision was 
increased by the Supreme Court. Moreover, an investigation, still pending, has been opened by the 
Cypriot Competition Authority, which is concerned that JCC Payment Systems Limited (JCC) and a 
number of commercial banks hold a collective dominant position and are in violation of competition 
law. According to the authority, these banks, inter alia, coordinated their behavior, subsequently 
resulting in high levels of domestic interchange fees. More information can be found in the document 
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Many other authorities in the European Competition Network have opened procedures95 or 
have already adopted decisions addressing interchange fees.96 Some of them accepted and 
made legally binding the commitments offered by the parties, thus leading to an interchange 
fee reduction.97 Taken all together, these proceedings demonstrate the restrictive approach 
adopted by competition authorities when scrutinising possible anti-competitive effects 
stemming from MIF. 
3.3 In the United States 
High levels of interchange fees have raised many competition and regulatory concerns also 
in the United States (hereinafter, U.S.).98  
These have been partially addressed in litigation.99  
In the U.S., contrary to what occurs in Europe - where the Commission or the national 
competition authorities can grant an exemption under Article 101(3) to any kind of restrictive 
agreement that fulfils the conditions laid down in the article - antitrust claims are evaluated 
under two standards of review: (1) the rule of reason, which entails the need to take into 
account all the information to determine the extent, or even existence of, the competitive or 
anticompetitive effects of the restraint; and (2) the per se rules that make invalid some 
                                                                                                                                                                     
prepared by the ECN Banking and Payments Subgroup, Information paper on competition enforcement in 
the payments sector, March 2012 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/ 
information_paper_payments_en.pdf), p. 27.  
95 In particular, investigations, which are still pending, have been opened in the following countries: 
Cyprus (the case has already been cited supra); Germany (where the proceeding concerns a possible 
violation of Article 101(1) and the corresponding national rules concerning MIF for domestic 
transactions within Germany using MasterCard/Visa branded credit cards). More information can be 
found in the document prepared by the ECN Banking and Payments Subgroup, cit., p. 36.  
96 See, for example, the decision taken by the Hungarian Competition Authority, of 24.9.2009, where it 
was ascertained that the Hungarian banks’ setting of uniform interchange fees for Visa and 
MasterCard card transactions infringed Article 101(1) and the corresponding national rules. The 
parties lodged an appeal before the Court, which suspended the proceeding with respect to the 
MasterCard case before the General Court. More information can be found in the document prepared 
by the ECN Banking and Payments Subgroup, cit., pp. 42-43. 
97 This happened in the following Member States: Estonia (decision of 20.2.2012 regarding the 
interchange fees for card payments applied by the main Estonian banks); France (decisions of 7.7.2011 
on MIF on GIE cartes bancaires payment cards; of 20.9.2013 on interbank fees applied by MasterCard 
and Visa to payments and local withdrawals made using consumer cards); Greece (decision of 
29.7.2008, regarding the MIF on debit card transactions and additional financial services set by many 
banks having residence in the Greek territory); Italy (decisions of 5.10.2010 regarding MIF for national 
transactions using national PagoBANCOMAT branded debit cards; of 5.10.2010 concerning MIF for 
national direct debit services; ATM cash withdrawal and other national payment services). More 
information on the cited cases can be found in the document prepared by the ECN Banking and 
Payments Subgroup, cit.. 
98 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2009), Report to Congressional Addressees, 
Credit Cards - Rising Interchange Fees Have Increased Costs for Merchants, but Options for Reducing 
Fees Pose Challenges, GAO-10-45, Washington, p. 13; R.J. Shapiro and J. Vellucci (2010), “The Costs of 
“Charging It” in America: Assessing the Economic Impact of Interchange Fees for Credit Card and 
Debit Card Transactions”, Sonecon LLC Studies, pp. 3-6. Moreover, in recent years, the MasterCard and 
Visa interchange rates have increased in the U.S. more than in other countries. 
99 A.A. Foer (2010), “Electronic Payment Systems and Interchange Fees: Breaking the Log Jam on 
Solutions to Market Power”, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/Interchange% 
20Foer.pdf, p. 2. 
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practices without needing a further analysis.100 According to antitrust doctrine, horizontal 
agreements between competitors to fix prices are per se illegal.101 Therefore interchange fees 
appear to be a type of per se illegal price fixing. However, since the NaBanco case102 of 1986, 
the courts, also following the Supreme Court’s decision in BMI,103 generally evaluate claims 
challenging interchange fees set under the rule of reason.104 In NaBanco, the Court found that 
interchange fees were not illegal price fixing because, first, they were indispensable to 
recover costs borne by issuing banks and, second, they were essential to creating a payment 
card system. The Court considered also that less restrictive alternatives did not exist, given 
that bilateral negotiations are impractical and, even more importantly, that three-party 
systems such as American Express or Diners Club did not offer credit options at that time.105 
With regard to impact on competition, the Court held that it was negligible. The main reason 
for this conclusion was that the Court considered that there was no distinct credit card 
market, thus defining the relevant product market as including all payment systems.106 
In recent years, the NaBanco Court analysis on market definition has been rejected by courts 
holding that there is an independent market for credit cards.107 More precisely, this 
happened in a proceeding regarding Visa and MasterCard’s rules preventing network banks 
from issuing other brands’ cards.108 In this case, the Second Circuit found that Visa and 
MasterCard jointly had market power as it was evident from their ability to raise prices and 
their market shares. As regards interchange fees, the Court held that there was evidence of 
the “defendant’s power to control prices or exclude competition”.109 As a matter of fact, first 
of all “both Visa and MasterCard have recently raised interchange rates charged to 
merchants […] without losing a single merchant customer as a result”110 and, secondly, they 
are able to charge different prices to merchants as a monopolist according to how much each 
merchant uses the credit cards.  
The U.S. v. Visa decision confirms the application of the rule of reason standard to payment 
card interchange fees. However, a rule of reason treatment implies also that the effects of 
interchange fees have to be assessed under market conditions, which have indeed changed 
considerably over recent years. American Express and Discover now issue nationwide credit 
                                                     
100 Semeraro, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 
101 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., [1940] 310 U.S. 150, 223. 
102 NaBanco (National Bankcard Corporation) v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., [1986] 779 F.2d 592, 11th Circuit. 
103 Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. (BMI), [1979] 441 U.S. This case can be considered 
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104 D.S. Evans and R Schmalensee (1995), “Economic Aspects of Payment Card Systems and Antitrust 
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107 Ibid., pp. 721-723. 
108 United States v. Visa U.S.A., [2003] 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335 (S.D.N.Y.). 
109 Ibid., § 340. 
110 Ibid., § 341. 
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cards, therefore the argument that cooperation among banks is necessary for a nationally 
accepted payment card to be created no longer exists. Moreover, while in the 1980s credit 
card transactions were costly, now they take place electronically and the risk and float in the 
system have been substantially reduced. Finally, the U.S. credit card market is more 
concentrated than in the past, thus making bilateral agreements or, generally, less restrictive 
alternatives to interchange fees not “impractical”.111 Under these assumptions, it is 
questionable whether the NaBanco findings would still be confirmed today. 
3.4 MIF and SEPA 
As described, in the MasterCard decision, it seemed that the Commission had taken the view 
that MIF is anti-competitive, no matter how high it is. This position became an important 
point of reference for banks in the migration process to SEPA. By referring very often to 
those payment card systems within the European Economic Area - such as in Denmark, 
Norway and Finland - functioning without MIF, the Commission stressed that the 
MasterCard decision would have actually supported the creation of SEPA.112 On the other 
hand, banks argued that MIF cannot be condemned and considered illegal a priori and that 
the Commission’s approach against the use of MIF would have damaged the SEPA initiative 
as banks would have had to devise new financing rules to substitute MIF. The risk was that 
this strict and formalist approach taken by the Commission would undermine the banks’ 
efforts toward SEPA and cause uncertainties and delays in the migration of domestic 
payments to SEPA.113 
In April 2009 by means of press releases, the Competition Directorate General for 
Competition of the European Commission (hereinafter, DG COMP) made clear 
under what circumstances a MIF could fulfil the exemption criteria of Article 101(3) 
TFEU. This was an important step in respect of a request for certainty on the 
compatibility with competition rules of MIF in the SEPA process.114 After stating that 
in the MasterCard decision it “did not rule out the possibility that a MIF may be 
indispensable to creating efficiencies the benefits of which may outweigh the 
restriction of competition”, the Commission explained that an exemption may be 
granted only if the method to determine the level of interchange fees is transparent. 
From this perspective, the methodology developed in economic literature and called 
‘avoided-cost test’, ‘tourist test’ or ‘MIT’ (Merchant Indifference Test) is approved by 
the Commission insofar as it ensures that not only that merchants benefit but also the 
costs they have to sustain for card payments are taken into account.115 At the same 
                                                     
111 Semeraro, op. cit., p. 3. 
112 European Commission (2007), “Antitrust: Commission Prohibits MasterCard’s Intra-EEA 
Multilateral Interchange Fees”, Press Release IP/07/1959, Brussels, 19.12.2007. 
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114 European Commission (2009), “Antitrust: Commissioner Kroes Takes Note of MasterCard’s 
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transactional benefits that card use generates for them - for example a reduction in transportation and 
security expenses - and the amount of the MIF - the so-called “balancing fee” - is calculated by 
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time, a low level of interchange rates for both debit and credit cards must be 
introduced by card brands. Furthermore, in order to increase transparency, cross-
border MIF have to be published on the website of the card brand and the latter has 
to inform merchants that they can accept competing schemes’ cards, thus excluding a 
full application of the honour all cards rule. Finally, card brands should introduce a rule 
requiring the acquiring banks to offer the merchants different rates according to the type of 
card that is used (unblending) - credit or debit cards issued by banks belonging to the same 
network or cards issued by competing schemes. In the MasterCard case, an independent 
trustee was appointed in order to monitor MasterCard’s compliance every six months with 
the undertakings given to the Commission. 
The aforementioned EU cases are relevant not only for their economic and practical 
implications but also for the Commission’s statements on MIF for SEPA. 
First of all, if it is a specific level of interchange fee that raises competition concerns, there is a 
risk for the Commission to become a quasi-regulatory agency either involved in market 
assessment every six months or forced to rely on the monitoring of an independent trustee 
appointed by card brands in order to determine the ‘right’ level of interchange fee that may 
lead to an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. In order to avoid running the risk of acting 
as regulators, competition authorities, including the Commission, tend to rarely attack 
excessive pricing abuses of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU, while concentrating 
their efforts on exclusionary conducts.116 From this point of view, interchange fee cases can 
be considered to be excessive pricing cases but assessed under the framework of Article 101 
TFEU.117 
Secondly, under Regulation 1/2003, which made Article 101(3) directly applicable, 
companies are required to do a self-assessment of the consequences of their agreements and 
the obligation to notify restrictive agreements to the Commission is abolished.118 In spite of a 
reduction in the Commission’s workload, this new procedure raises many concerns in terms 
of legal certainty, especially for complex cases such as interchange fee agreements.119  
Finally, two other elements that should be taken into account - and which were at the centre 
of the discussion in the U.S. on the need for a regulatory intervention from the Federal 
Reserve in this field - are the fact that litigation takes too long120 and “even settlements and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
comparing the merchants’ costs of accepting payments in cash to those of accepting payments made 
by a payment card. The implementation of the balancing fee ensures that the merchant is indifferent 
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Commission, Press Release MEMO/09/143, cit. 
116 G. Monti (2007), EC Competition Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 218-220; Whish, 
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120 Foer, op. cit., p. 2. 
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judgments do not always solve all the underlying problems, especially where the defendants 
retain market power even after the case is resolved.”121 
As previously mentioned in the introduction, these shortfalls have opened - together with 
other issues - the debate on whether MIF should only be considered as a competition issue or 
whether it would be more appropriate to consider MIF within a wider regulatory 
framework. In that latter case, competencies of different authorities would need to be 
considered (in particular, the role of Central Banks vis-à-vis antitrust authorities). 
4. Competition Law or Specific Regulatory Measures? 
4.1 Which Public Policy Option? 
Antitrust authorities seem to agree that the current method of determining interchange fees 
allows participants to set the fees at very high levels that are not desirable (that is to say, they 
are ’excessive’ in competition terms) from an economic efficiency and consumer welfare 
perspective.122 
With Vickers, three possible public policy approaches could be adopted to overcome this 
problem.123 
The first one would be to give the market and their participants discretion to decide the level 
of interchange fees without any kind of public intervention. This option may be justified if 
the costs of the public intervention outweigh its benefits. However, regulating MIF is 
unlikely to be excessively costly. 
There are thus two ‘interventionist’ alternatives to this approach. On the one hand, one may 
argue that agreements among banks to determine the level of interchange fees should come 
under close scrutiny of competition authorities. On the other, one may be in favour of a 
regulatory intervention by a regulator, such as a central bank.  
While in recent years many antitrust authorities all over the world have opened proceedings 
against card brands in order to verify whether agreements to establish collectively the level 
of interchange fees are anticompetitive, the Central Banks have also started looking into the 
issue. In particular, in Australia the RBA addressed market failures in the payment card 
sector by mandatorily lowering the level of interchange fee from approximately 0.95 percent 
to 0.55 percent, and changing some network rules. In parallel, in the US, under the Durbin 
Amendment, the Bureau for Financial Consumer Protection and the Fed are called to 
intervene. 
Besides these experiences, we could also learn a lot from the discussion in the UK, where the 
government published consultation paper “Opening up UK payments”124 proposing the 
establishment of a new competition-focused, utility-style regulator for retail payment 
systems. In this paper, the starting point was the government’s concerns on the governance 
of payment systems, under the oversight of the Payments Council, an industry body lacking 
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effective public accountability. In particular, the dominance of large UK banks over the 
decision-making process of the Payments Council made it unable to perform adequately its 
advisory and strategy-setting tasks in order to respond to the needs of payment system users 
and to secure agreement to deliver projects not in the members’ immediate commercial 
interests. As a result of these problems, three alternatives were envisaged:125 (i) to make 
changes to the current system’s governance; (ii) to introduce the Payments Strategy Board 
(“PSB”) - a new body open to strong industry influence - to set strategy across the UK 
payments industry; or (iii) to create a new economic regulator with responsibility for 
payment systems. While, at first glance, the PSB was thought to be the best option, the 
government then realised that giving regulatory powers to a body susceptible to strong 
industry influence would not tackle the aforementioned issues. Consequently, the only 
solution was to create a formal system of utility-style regulator for retail payment systems.126 
From this point of view, three options127 were set out by the UK government for the body to 
which the regulatory powers will be given: (i) a new stand-alone regulator; (ii) the Financial 
Conduct Authority (“FCA”); or (iii) one of the existing economic regulators. In its summary 
of responses to the consultation, the government decided that the FCS should be given the 
role of Payment Systems Regulator for reasons mainly related to its knowledge of existing 
regulation, its existing financial services knowledge and understanding of the market as a 
whole and, finally, its relationship with relevant UK and EU regulatory bodies.128 Moreover, 
the consultation proposed that the Payment Systems Regulator would exercise concurrent 
competition powers129 in order to tackle ant-competitive conditions in the market. 
The UK example, even if related to payment systems as a whole, is extremely interesting 
from three points of view. The first is that it warns against the risks of self-regulatory 
initiatives eventually establishing a body subject to strong industry influence and thus 
unable to create an environment where consumers and the economy as a whole can benefit 
from payment systems. Second, the consultation paper highlights pros and cons of creating 
an entirely new, stand-alone regulator which, while it has the advantage of offering a fresh 
start, single-focus body, would result in an extremely expensive way of proceeding. Third, 
the government’s proposal to give the Payment Systems Regulator competition powers has 
been opposed by some respondents - mainly lager banks, payment scheme companies and 
card networks – who argue that it would be better for the Regulator to refer competition 
issues to the competent national authority. 
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where the government highlighted the need to address all the problems faced by the current system of 
governance for the UK payment system.  
126 HM Treasury, cit., pp. 8-9. 
127 Ibid., p. 10. 
128 HM Treasury (2013), Opening up UK payments: response to consultation, October, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249085/PU156
3_Opening_up_UK_payments_Government_response.pdf, pp. 5-6).  
129 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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4.2 The Debate Surrounding SEPA Cards Framework: Competition Meeting 
Integration Issues 
Before considering how regulators outside the EU have acted on MIF, it is worth considering 
how the EU Commission itself switches from competition to regulatory stances and 
instruments in the way it approaches the sector. We can start with the most common feature: 
the overlapping of competition and integration issues, specifically arising within SEPA. 
In order to implement the SEPA process, the European banking sector has built a working 
group, the European Payments Council (hereinafter, EPC), whose main task is to define 
standardisation rules for payment instruments. More precisely, the project creates three pan-
European payment schemes (the SEPA Credit Transfer Scheme Rulebook,130 SEPA Direct 
Debit Scheme Rulebook131 and SEPA Cards Framework)132 for the three payment 
instruments which are regarded to be the most relevant ones from an economic perspective 
(credit transfers, direct debits and cards). 
This self-regulatory initiative has progressed in parallel with the action taken by the 
European Commission to create the legal framework for such integration: in November 2007 
the Payments Service Directive (hereinafter, PSD)133 was definitively agreed upon. 
Moreover, some recent regulatory interventions at EU level were clearly aimed at fostering 
and accelerating the EU payment market integration, including proposals for reform of the 
PSD, as will be illustrated in the following sections. 
As regards interchange fees, the position expressed by the EPC in the latest version of the 
SEPA Cards Framework is the following: “Interchange fees can be a necessary enabler for the 
operation and development of the card business, and for sound co-operation between banks 
in competition with each other”.134  
It is interesting to note that the first sentence was less nuanced in the previous version of the 
framework for cards, which stated instead that: “Interchange fees have proven to be a 
necessary enabler for the operation and development of card business”(emphasis added).135 
The change in language is mainly due to the many modifications that have occurred in recent 
years in the Commission’s position on interchange fees, thus making the costs-based 
argument that supports the necessity of interchange fee less compelling.  
In light of these statements, it is not surprising that the preferred solution within the ECP 
schemes has been to allow a multilateral fall-back interchange fee. Nevertheless, this does 
not solve the problem of the level of interchange fee that, according to the Commission, 
would be compatible with competition rules and at the same time accepted by all 
participating banks in all countries. 
                                                     
130 EPC (2009), SEPA Credit Transfer Scheme Rulebook, Version 3.3, Frankfurt.  
131 EPC (2009), SEPA Direct Debit Scheme Rulebook, Version 3.4, Frankfurt.  
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Independently from the option finally preferred at the EU level, three alternatives would 
exist in theory. 
First, one payment brand could set the interchange fee at a level that corresponds to the 
average of interchange fees in the countries within the SEPA territory. However, since there 
are wide discrepancies in the interchange rate levels, this solution could lead some countries 
to be better off and others worse off. 
Another possible scenario would be the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the 
largest European banks that have many cross-border card transactions. The problem with 
this alternative is that it is almost impossible to negotiate bilaterally with all European 
players. 
Although it could be argued that a MIF is necessary so that all the transactions are possible, 
as illustrated, this might result in high tariffs. Therefore, one may be in favour of a 
differentiated interchange fee structure that depends on the development of the payment 
cards market in each country.136 According to this third option, given the market 
fragmentation across Europe, the interchange fee could be a ‘balancing mechanism’ between 
the issuers and the acquirers only if there is a country-by-country approach.  
While the ECB was previously clearly in favour of a “single interchange fee (if any) for the 
whole area within a given brand”,137 in a more recent report on SEPA it states that a 
differentiation of interchange fees “could be accepted during a transition period in order to 
facilitate change in national markets [...]”.138 In addition to the difficulty international brands 
can face when defining for each country a different MIF,139 the absence of a unified 
interchange fee is still in conflict with the idea of SEPA and especially with the goal of 
having converging tariffs between countries. 
Another major element in the analysis of SEPA is the problem of “migration”. This is related 
to the fact that, in order to have a truly integrated payment system, both domestic payments 
and cross-border ones should be processed over the same infrastructure. Consequently, 
domestic payments have to migrate from the domestic systems to the SEPA one. To this end, 
the SEPA Cards Framework identifies three possibilities for a payment scheme to become 
SEPA-compliant: (1) replacement of a national scheme by an international one which is 
already SEPA-compliant; (2) the expansion of national schemes to the entire euro area or the 
creation of a new European Card scheme; and (3) to co-brand a national scheme with an 
international one.140 
Due to the supply-driven characteristic of the migration141 and the higher level of 
interchange fees in the case of migration to an international brand (option 1), the decisions 
taken by banks to move from domestic brands to an international one merit close 
                                                     
136 L. Van Hove (2007), “SEPA & Debit-Card Interchange Fees: One Size Fits None?”, SPEED - 
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137 ECB (2006), The Eurosystem’s View of a “SEPA for Cards”, Frankfurt, p. 13. 
138 ECB (2007), Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA): From Concept to Reality, Frankfurt, p. 13. 
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interchange rates at least during a transition period. See MasterCard (2007), MasterCard Europe 
Extends Timetable for Introduction of Maestro SEPA Fallback Interchange Rates, 31.5. 2007. 
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140 ECB (2006), cit., pp. 6-10. 
141 NMa (2008), SEPA Vision Document. A Single Payments Market, Increasing Competition?, The 
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competition scrutiny. Moreover, in addition to the advantage of already having SEPA-
compliant products, international brands also provide processing services for banks. In spite 
of the prohibition - provided for in the SEPA Cards Framework142 - on tying the card 
schemes and the processing services, there may be a risk that card companies cross-subsidise 
the processing services through the revenues generated by the card schemes.143 In this way, 
they can exclude potential competitors from the market and raise prices. If the company 
occupies a dominant position, this conduct may amount to an abuse of dominant position 
under Article 102 TFEU. Cross-subsidisation is defined as the situation in which an 
“undertaking provides financial support in whatever form to one of its activities or a 
segment of activity form internal resources generated by another activity or segment”.144 
Even if there is consensus that cross-subsidisation does not constitute an abuse in itself,145 it 
“may facilitate abusive pricing practices such as predation and selective price cutting”.146 
As the ECB points out, the co-branding option also gives rise to concerns, since “it could 
crystallise national fragmentation” without bringing about the economies of scale that SEPA 
aims to create in the euro area.147 
To overcome these potential anti-competitive/anti-integration effects, national payment 
schemes could develop a new European card brand. At the moment, three European 
initiatives have emerged: Euro Alliance of Payment Schemes (EAPS), launched by six 
payment systems,148 the Monnet initiative149 and the PayFair initiative.150 In spite of the 
potential benefits that these European schemes may create, there is still a high level of 
uncertainty on the determination of MIF. This is the main reason that the Commission 
decided to take further steps and propose a regulation introducing a cap on MIF, as we will 
discuss further. 
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148 PagoBancomat (Italy), SIBS (Portugal), Link (United Kingdom), Euro6000 (Spain), ZKA (Germany), 
EUFISERV (Europe). More information on EAPS can be found at: http://www.card-alliance.eu. 
149 It is driven by German and French banks. See Bolt  and Schmiedel, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
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4.3 EU Regulatory Intervention 
4.3.1 The Green Paper 
Competition versus integration is not the only issue the Commission has addressed for 
payments. As mentioned, it has now deeply regulated the sector, with a number of measures 
addressing various different objectives. 
In January 2012, the European Commission published a Green Paper on card, internet and 
mobile payments151 which, on the one hand, identified secure, efficient and competitive 
payments as a crucial factor for the development of the single market in the EU and, on the 
other hand, outlined the increasing importance of mobile and on-line payments and their 
likelihood to affect the future functioning of the market. 
In this framework, the Commission first assessed the current landscape and obstacles that 
potentially prevent market integration in the card, internet and mobile payments market. It 
subsequently set out the gaps between the current situation and its vision and the ways to 
stimulate market integration. 
As regards the Commission’s vision and objectives for the payments market, is the Green 
Paper clearly states: “there should be no distinction between cross-border and domestic 
payments” or “non-euro payments within the EU”.152 This means that, in order to facilitate 
competition and increase innovation, transparency and market security, more integration of 
payment systems is needed so that: (i) consumers are able to use a single bank account for all 
payments of transactions, independently from the country where they live or operate, if 
different from the one of origin; (ii) businesses and public administrations can centralise 
financial operations across the EU; (iii) merchants can benefit from cheap, efficient and 
secure electronic payments; (iv) payment service providers can benefit from economies of 
scale brought about by payment instrument standardisation; and (v) technology providers 
can base their research for innovation on pan-European instruments. 
The Commission then makes reference to six issues which must be addressed in order to 
achieve full market integration. One of them is particularly important from a competition 
point of view, that of regulating MIFs and related measures. 
More precisely, the Commission doubts that the existence of different MIF levels throughout 
the EU, and on-going or completed proceedings before competition authorities, could lead to 
distortions and exacerbate market fragmentation. Moreover, MIF are likely to act as entry 
barriers to low-cost card schemes and mobile or internet means of payment. In light of the 
aforementioned issues, the Green Paper asks stakeholders to contribute to the Commission’s 
analysis regarding the need to regulate fees, to increase legal clarity and transparency so that 
market access is facilitated. 
In addition, a violation of competition rules may derive from cross-border acquiring and, in 
particular, from the rule pursuant to which acquiring banks must pay the MIF of the country 
where the merchant is located, so that the merchant is prevented from choosing an acquirer, 
possibly cheaper, outside its own Member State. 
Other measures linked to the MIF are those regarding transparency and business rules. 
According to the Commission, the key issue here is whether empowering merchants to make 
use of rebates, surcharging and other steering practices - such as the merchant’s selective 
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acceptance of certain cards, or the clear indication of the preferred payment instrument - 
would stimulate the use of the most efficient payment means. These concerns are increased 
by the current legal framework, which is far from having increased transparency in the 
consumer-merchant relationship. This would be due to the fact that, according to Article 
52(3) of the PSD, merchants are allowed to surcharge and offer rebates, but Member States 
can still prohibit or limit surcharging if some conditions are fulfilled. Member States have 
applied this provision in different ways, thus increasing confusion among consumers and 
merchants, especially in the case of cross-border transactions. 
4.3.2 The Proposed Amendments to the Payment Services Directive (PSD) 
The main aim of the Green Paper was to launch a public consultation process with 
stakeholders in order to validate the Commission’s analysis and to help identify the main 
obstacles to a full market integration in the payment sector. The comments and contributions 
received led to the conclusion that further measures and regulatory updates were needed so 
that the payment legislative framework could better contribute to the creation of an effective, 
efficient and competitive European payments environment. 
This review process also strongly affected the PSD,153 adopted in 2007 with the aim of 
harmonising the rules on any transfer of money and, in particular, the relations between 
users and providers of the payment services, thus providing the legal framework of the 
SEPA project.154 While the consultation results called for various adjustments to the existing 
rules, in this paper attention will be focused only on the proposed policy measures 
addressed in the revised PSD which relate to our analysis. 
In particular, two adaptations to the existing PSD and which are contained in the proposed 
new Directive require an in-depth investigation. 
The first main modification concerns Article 28 of the current PSD, on access to payment 
systems. Pursuant to this provision, rules on access must be objective, non-discriminatory 
and proportionate. This language seems to make reference to the essential facility doctrine, 
an elaboration of competition law according to which any network, infrastructure or 
technology connecting or exclusively shared among a number of actors that results to be 
essential for competitors to provide down-stream services, needs to be potentially open to 
any actor requesting access, providing that this respects the rules on access to the system, 
which in turn must indeed be objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Furthermore, 
the article contains a list of requirements that payment systems cannot impose on payment 
service providers, payment service users, or other payment systems once these are part of the 
system. Nonetheless, given that the main aim of these prohibitions seems to be a guarantee 
of non-discrimination among different institutions (credit vs. non-credit institutions), and 
not to regulate access stricto sensu, it is arguable that this provision is a competition rule or a 
regulatory measure. Two arguments militate in favour of this last interpretation. First, 
such prohibitions apply also to payment service users that are not actual or potential 
competitors, and thus contravene the general principle that competition law only 
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intervenes in relationships between (actual or potential) competitors, or when the 
competitive context could be altered.  
Secondly, according to Article 28 paragraph 2, the rules described (established in 
paragraph 1) do not apply to systems with a sole payment service provider, since they 
offer services in a niche market, which has never been a relevant criterion for competition, 
when only de minimis rules might apply and under certain conditions.155A niche market may 
in fact be a separate market by itself, subject to competition law like any other market. It 
would thus seem that Article 28 of the PSD addresses regulatory requirements beyond 
competition issues. If this is the case, it can be concluded that the PSD itself recognises room 
for regulation of these matters under policy considerations encompassing competition but 
going much further. To confirm this, Article 28 would be applied by domestic authorities in 
charge of licensing and monitoring payment institutions rather than by antitrust authorities. 
Having said this, Article 29 of the revised new Directive proposes to improve the rules 
regarding access to payment systems by clarifying that indirect access of payment 
institutions to payment systems should also be provided to other authorised or registered 
payment service providers under objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate rules. 
Moreover, the Impact Assessment carried out by the Commission with the purpose of 
analysing the potential consequences of a lack of a fully integrated European payment 
market, examined, inter alia, problems arising from diverse charging practices between 
Member States. From this point of view, as mentioned above, the existing PSD rules, which 
are quite flexible in allowing Member States to limit or even prohibit surcharging under 
certain conditions, have led to extreme heterogeneity in the market, where 13 Member States 
have used this option to forbid surcharging. The existence of different regimes applied 
throughout Europe exacerbates market fragmentation and creates a confused situation for 
consumers, especially when they shop abroad or via the internet. In light of the issues arising 
from the Impact Assessment, Article 55(4) of the revised Directive prohibits surcharging for 
the use of payment instruments for which interchange fees are regulated under the new 
Commission proposal for a regulation on interchange fees for card-based payment 
transactions,156 presented in parallel with the proposed new PSD (and discussed below). 
This is because caps on interchange fees as proposed by this Regulation will have the effect 
of reducing the fees merchants have to pay to the acquirers. As a result, for MIF-regulated 
cards, amounting to approximately 95% of the consumer card market, there is no longer a 
possibility to surcharge. Finally, as regards cards which are not subject to the proposed 
regulation on interchange fees (i.e. three-party scheme cards and corporate cards) Article 
55(3) provides that merchants are still empowered to apply an additional charge which 
cannot exceed the costs borne by the payee for the use of the payment means. 
4.3.3 The SEPA Regulation and the Recent Commission Proposal for a Regulation 
on Interchange-Fees for Card-Based Payments 
The proposal for a regulation on interchange fees is a challenging initiative which will 
complement the existing rules regarding the creation of a fully-integrated payments market 
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and the migration to pan-European payment instruments, and will affect the structure of the 
market.157  
Among the already applicable regulatory interventions, one cannot ignore the importance of 
Regulation (EC) No. 924/2009 on cross-border payments.158 From a competition point of 
view, the Regulation on cross-border payments, in order to support the migration and the 
launch of EU-wide schemes, regulated the MIF for SEPA Direct Debit (SDD), related to 
services which enable customers to give companies or other organisations authorisation to 
withdraw funds directly from their bank accounts in order to pay their bills. Article 7 of the 
Regulation thus provided for a transitional regime until 1 November 2012, during which MIF 
for domestic direct debit transactions could continue to be applied at or below their existing 
level in the six Member States which had a MIF. On the contrary, according to Article 6, a 
MIF of up to 8.8 cents was applicable for each cross-border direct debit transaction executed 
before 1 November 2012. Then, in 2012, the SEPA Regulation was adopted, laying down 
rules for credit transfer and direct debit transactions denominated in euro within the 
European Union, where both the payer’s payment service provider (PSP) and the payee’s 
PSP are located in the Union, or the sole PSP is located in the Union.159 The SEPA Regulation 
sets the final end-date for national credit transfer and direct debit schemes at 1 February 
2014. As a result, from this date, the transactions will move to EU-wide schemes created by 
the SEPA, that is SEPA Credit Transfer (SCT) and SDD Schemes. The SEPA Regulation also 
provides that no per transaction MIF for national direct debits must be applied from 1 
February 2017. Additionally, MIF for cross-border direct debits were to be prohibited from 1 
November 2012. Nonetheless, MIF for transactions which are rejected, refused, returned or 
reversed because they cannot be properly executed or result in exception processing (known 
as “R-transactions”) will be allowed subject to certain conditions from February 2014. This 
exception is directly linked to the costs generated by direct debits which are not properly 
executed: an appropriate level of MIF applied to R-transactions aims at ensuring that the 
costs for the failure of the transaction are imposed on the party which is responsible, as this 
boosts efficiencies and discourages transactions failures.  
Despite the existence of the aforementioned rules, the Commission considered that a further 
step could have been taken in order to enable consumers, retailers and other undertakings to 
enjoy the full benefits of the EU internal market, by imposing caps also on the MIF applied in 
four-party card schemes. 
The Commission considered several adverse effects caused by interchange fees.160It noted 
that price increases caused by MIF and scheme rules applied by card brands are harmful to 
consumers and merchants, given that consumers are unaware of fee differences and 
merchants, because of network rules such as the honour all cards rule, cannot act to reduce 
the fees. Moreover, market transparency reducing measures and collectively agreed fees 
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discourage banks from competing on the level of their fees, thus leading to higher retail 
prices for all consumers, independently from the payment instrument chosen. Another effect 
related to the existence of a wide variety of interchange fees would be market fragmentation 
and retailers’ difficulty in formulating an EU price strategy for their products and services. 
Finally, inter-bank fees would also hinder market entry, as they operate as a minimum 
threshold to convince issuing payment service providers to issue payment cards or other 
payment instruments. This situation is perceived as even more problematic for pan-
European players, given that domestic MIF varieties force new entrants to offer fees which 
are at least comparable to those prevailing in each market they want to enter.  
Against this background, the proposal first introduces a cap on interchange fees for all card 
transactions that are widely used by consumers, that is: consumer debit and credit card and 
card-based payment transactions. Consequently, the proposed regulation would not apply to 
transactions with commercial cards, close networks, or cards issued by three-party schemes.  
First of all, under Article 3, within two months of entry into force, a maximum level of 
interchange fees are imposed on cross-border transactions, amounting to 0.20% for cross-
border debit card transactions, and 0.30% for cross-border credit card transactions. Article 4 
then provides that, after a transitional period of two years, all (cross-border and domestic) 
consumer debit and credit card transactions fees will be subject to the aforementioned caps. 
In the Commission’s view, the proposed level of interchange fee regulation is reasonable and 
does not negatively affect the viability of the network or retailers and consumers’ welfare, 
provided that the caps are proposed by card schemes in competition proceedings161 and 
ensure legal certainty.162 
The proposed regulation also sets out permitted business rules that will be applicable to all 
categories of card transaction, as well as card-based payment transactions based on them. So, 
for instance, pursuant to Article 10, the application of the honour all cards rule will be 
limited, so that no rule will be permitted that obliges the payee to accept cards or other 
payment instrument schemes issued by one party issuing PSP within the framework of a 
payment instrument scheme, but that also accepts other payment instruments of the same 
brand, except if they are subject to the same regulated interchange fees. Nonetheless, no 
discrimination can be allowed on the basis of the identity of the issuing payment service 
provider or of the cardholder. Moreover, Article 11 prohibits the application of any rule 
preventing or limiting merchants from steering consumers towards the use of specific 
payment instruments preferred by the retailer.  
Overall, the proposed Regulation of interchange fees ensures legal clarity, favours a level 
playing field, and allows consumers and retailers to have accurate information. From this 
point of view, it has been correctly pointed out that a regulation was the best legislative 
instrument for pursuing the aforementioned aims, provided that a directive could not ensure 
standardisation at the technical level and the fullest possible harmonisation. Moreover, there 
seemed to be no alternative to such a proposal, given that both the legislative and regulatory 
measures already in force and competition law enforcement at European and national levels 
were not able to address directly the issues arising from different levels of MIF throughout 
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Europe, and lack of transparency in the consumer-merchant relationship. This is because, for 
one thing, there is no specific domestic legislation regulating inter-bank fees, except in 
Denmark,163 although a certain number of Member States, including Poland, Hungary, the 
UK and Italy, seem to be in the process of adopting similar legislation.164 At the same time, 
the European Commission and many national competition authorities have on-going 
proceedings aiming at scrutinising compatibility with competition law of interbank-fee levels 
and network rules. As a result, it is clear that the intended national laws and the different 
time-paths and procedures of competition law enforcement may result in an even more 
fragmented market, and are likely not to unlock market integration and innovation in the 
payment sector.   
It must also be appreciated that the Commission acknowledges the substantially 
unpredictable overall impact of interbank-fees caps on PSPs and, indirectly, on consumers.165 
Nevertheless, it makes reference to effects on the market produced by other EU and extra-EU 
experiences where schemes are currently functioning without MIF, or where an interchange 
fee regulation has already been adopted and implemented, and where an interbank-fee 
decrease has resulted, on the retailers’ side, in lower fees and greater savings, some of which 
are passed on to consumers, for example through higher card acceptance.166 A consequent 
positive effect of higher card usage would be the compensation of losses suffered by banks 
because of the MIF caps with higher revenues arising from an increase in the volume of card 
transactions. As a consequence, banks would not need to increase cardholder fees in order to 
ensure the network operation.  So, for example, in the US, banks tried to raise annual card 
fees after the MIF regulation introduction, but they had to stop this initiative because of 
consumer revolt.167 Finally, low interchange fees incentivise new entry into the payment 
market, as occurred in the Netherlands, where fees below 0.20% encouraged the 
development of “Ideal”, a cheap on-line payment solution.168 
However, the Proposed Regulation also raises concerns for the Commission’s competition 
approach to card schemes. The proposal states that the envisaged measures “broadly 
support other Union policies, in particular competition policy”;169 yet recital 14 clarifies: 
“The application of this Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Union and 
national competition rules.” What does this second statement mean exactly? Does it mean 
that the card schemes’ compliance with the regulation does not prevent that, in certain 
circumstances, MIF applied to credit and debit card transactions could be considered 
contrary to Article 101(1) and not exempted under Article 101(3)? If this is the actual 
meaning of the statement, it risks posing problems from two points of view. First, the 
Commission cannot ignore the need to ensure that the proposed regulatory intervention is 
                                                     
163 See Article 80 of the Danish Payment Services and Electronic Money Act, Consolidating Act no. 365 
of 26.4.2011, available at: http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/en/Regler-og-praksis/Translated-
regulations/~/media/Reglerog-praksis/2012/C_Act365_2011_new.ashx. This legislative act regulates 
MSCs for face-to-face transactions, and sets out an annual fee which must paid by merchants. 
164 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on interchange fees for card-based payment 
transactions, cit., § 1, pp. 4-5. 
165 Ibid., § 2, p. 11. 
166 Ibid., § 2, p. 10. This is true, for example, in Denmark, where no fees applied to debit card schemes 
are associated with the highest card usage rates in the EU. 
167 Ibid., § 2, p. 11. The absence of a direct link between decrease of MIF and higher card annual fees 
can be also observed in Switzerland, Australia and Spain.  
168 Ibid., § 2, p. 12.  
169 Ibid., § 1, p. 5.  
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consistent with competition law enforcement. Thus competition enforcement would be 
questionable in the case of ascertaining a competition law infringement due to card brands’ 
observance of MIF levels, which, apart from having been regulated, were regarded in many 
EU and national proceedings as addressing competition concerns. Second, in this scenario, 
the objectives and the benefits envisaged in the proposal risk disappearing, given that card 
brands’ concern that their conduct could still be subject to competition scrutiny would 
increase uncertainty and discourage innovation and market entry.  
It is therefore desirable that the Commission clarify its position on this point.170 This is 
particularly so if one considers the effects of the lack of consistent approach between 
regulatory intervention and competition law enforcement experienced in the 
telecommunications sector, where it has been stated that sector-specific regulation did not 
prevent companies from adjusting their charges in order to avoid margin squeeze.171 The 
idea standing behind this conclusion is that competition and regulation rules are aimed at 
different goals.172 So, if competition law ensures the protection of the market in order to 
maximise consumer welfare, some goals (e.g., pluralism in the media or control of financial 
institutions’ solvency) can be achieved only by adopting regulation. In these cases, 
competition law and regulation could be considered complementary instruments, and they 
may be applied in a cumulative way. However, it could be argued that sectoral regulation is 
actually an alternative to competition law.173 Regulators in Europe intervene in some 
industries to enhance competition by means of several measures, such as mandatory third-
party access/interconnection of networks at regulated prices or corporate separation. If 
properly applied, these measures can actually prevent anti-competitive conduct.174 In these 
cases, it should be up to the legislator to decide what the best option is, taking into account 
benefits and drawbacks of the instruments available. On the one hand, competition law 
should be preferred when there is no need for oversight of the market, or if ex ante regulatory 
enforcement is too costly or may even lead to a distortion of market outcomes. On the other 
hand, regulation could be better-suited when: (i) consistent, definitive and fast basic rules are 
desirable in order to avoid excessive uncertainty; (ii) the standard of proof applicable in 
competition law cases cannot be reached; (iii) issues at stake require a technical expertise; 
and (iv) similar cases come under scrutiny. 
From this point of view, discussions within Europe may be enriched by looking at the 
experience in the US. There, with the incorporation of economic analysis in antitrust 
investigations, it has been stated that antitrust law should pursue consumers’ welfare rather 
                                                     
170 From this point of view, it would be interesting to follow the discussion in the UK, related to the 
government’s proposal to create a new competition-focused, utility-style regulator for retail payment 
systems. Some market players have called into question the actual need to empower the regulator 
with concurrent competition tasks. See, supra. 
171 See Commission decisions of 21.05.2003, Deutsche Telekom AG, [2003] O.J. L. 263, 14.10.2003, upheld 
by the General Court and the Court of Justice, and of 04.07.2007, Wanadoo España vs. Telefónica, upheld 
by the General Court. Nevertheless, the existence of the regulatory framework was taken into account 
as a mitigating circumstance in the calculation of the fine. See, also, Commission decision of 22.06.2001, 
Telekomunikacja Polska, concerning a constructive refusal to supply abuse, where the Commission 
dismissed the argument regarding a possible violation of ne bis in idem principle, § 97. 
172 D. Geradin (2011), “Refusal to Supply and Margin Squeeze: A Discussion of Why the ‘Telefonica 
Exceptions’ are Wrong”, (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1750226). 
173 J.C. Laguna de Paz (2012), “Regulation and Competition Law”, ECLR, Vol. 33, II. 
174 N. Petit (2004), The Proliferation of National Regulatory Authorities Alongside Competition 
Authorities in the EC: A Source of Jurisdictional Confusion”, (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=527403). 
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than small competitors’ welfare, and that it should never become a de facto tool for 
liberalisation to encourage new entry into the market. As a result, given that, in some 
markets, regulation (as the Supreme Court held in Trinko and in linkLine)175 is an “effective 
steward of the antitrust function”, an antitrust authority should not intervene when a 
regulatory regime exists to deter and remedy the anti-competitive harm, as the costs of 
antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the benefits.176 
4.4 The Australian and the US Cases 
As mentioned, the RBA is the first regulator to have addressed market failures in the 
payment card sector by lowering the level of interchange fees and by changing network rules 
in order to increase competition. 
After having received the power to regulate payment systems in 1998, and having carried 
out some research, the RBA concluded that: “Co-operative behaviour [...] is anti-competitive 
and, where it is allowed, it typically requires some form of dispensation by competition 
authorities on the basis that there are offsetting benefits to the public”.177 In 2003, Visa and 
MasterCard’s MIF were lowered from approximately 0.95 to 0.55%.178 Apart from capping 
interchange fees, the RBA modified network rules, prohibiting no surcharge rules and 
honour all cards rule. Moreover, the RBA encouraged increased transparency in retail 
payment systems. 
Interesting effects of the reform on the retail payment market have been identified.  
Despite what card brands had predicted, the “average merchant fees for MasterCard and 
Visa [...] fell as much as the reduction in interchange fees, then even further”.179 Moreover, 
even if price regulation was not imposed on three-party systems, “the combined average 
merchant service fee for the American Express/Diners Club schemes continued to decline in 
2008/2009 falling by 0.1 percentage points to 2.04%. These fees have fallen steadily since the 
implementation of the reforms and in June 2009 were around 0.43 percentage points lower 
than they were prior to the reforms”.180 This result is similar in size to that obtained by 
regulation of four-party systems.181 
The Australian reform attracted many criticisms.182 The most significant was that, 
considering that the commitments to cap interchange fees did not apply to three-party 
systems, the market shares of three-party systems were likely to rise. Nonetheless, “although 
                                                     
175 Supreme Court of the United States, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine  Communications Inc., 
555 U.S. 438, 25.2.2009. 
176 G. Alan Hay and K. McMahon (2012), “The Diverging Approach to Price Squeezes in the United 
States and Europe”, (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1997384).  
177 OECD (2006), Policy Roundtable: Competition and Efficient Usage of Payment Cards, Paris, p. 42. 
178 Heimler, op. cit. 
179 Frankel, op. cit., p. 59. 
180 RBA (2009), Annual Report, Sydney, p. 14. 
181 Heimler, op. cit. and Frankel, op. cit., pp. 60-63. 
182  H. Chang, D. S. Evans and D. D. Garcia Swartz (2005), “The Effect of Regulatory Intervention in 
Two-Sided Markets: An Assessment of Interchange-Fee Capping in Australia”, Review of Network 
Economics, Vol. 4; Muris, op. cit., pp. 533-541; J.S. Gans and S. P. King (2002), 
“A Theoretical Analysis of Credit Card Regulation”, Melbourne Business School Working Paper N. 2002-
11, pp. 3-6; J.S. Gans and S. P. King (2003), “Approaches to Regulating Interchange Fees in Payment 
Systems”, Review of Network Economics, Vol. 2, II, pp. 140-142. 
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there was some growth in the usage of American Express and Diners Club cards relative to 
four-party cards, the growth occurred in early 2004 and did not initiate a persistent trend. 
[...] Since the beginning of 2005, the three-party share of transactions has averaged 2.0 
percentage points higher than during the period January 2002 through September 2003, and 
the percentage of transaction value only 1.5 percentage points higher than in the earlier 
period. For the past three and a half years, there has been no increase in the three party share of card 
transactions” (emphasis added).183 
It seems that the main reason for which three-party systems did not grow at the expense of 
four-party systems was the elimination of the no-surcharge rule that allows merchants to set 
different prices even for different card brands, thus inducing customers to use the less 
expensive cards. This decision was taken by the RBA in spite of strong opposition expressed 
by card brands. The result was that “some Australian merchants did begin to surcharge - and 
sometimes surcharged only three-party card transactions, or surcharged them at higher 
rates. According to both MasterCard and Diners Club, these surcharges on American 
Express and Diners Club transactions contributed to the lack of growth in the three-party 
networks’ share of transactions”.184 
According to the two-sided market argument, regulation of interchange fees in order to 
reduce their level would only have the effect of shifting the costs of card payments from 
merchants to cardholders. Yet this did not happen in Australia. As a matter of fact, “[t]he 
reduction of the interchange fee by 45 basis points has so far generated a 57 basis point 
reduction in the average Visa/MasterCard merchant service charge”. Some economists have 
suggested that 30 to 40% of the lost interchange fee revenue was compensated for by setting 
higher fees to cardholders. If this finding is correct, “that still leaves a net decline in the total 
‘price level’ equal to roughly 41 basis points - nearly as much as the reduction in interchange 
fees. Moreover, this does not take into account at all the reduction in American Express and 
Diners Club merchant fees […]”.185 
According to the RBA, the 2007/2008 review of the 2003 regulatory intervention shows that 
“reforms have delivered significant benefits, improving the overall efficiency of Australia’s 
payment system”.186 Given this industry progress, the RBA decided to postpone 
consideration of any further reduction of the level of MIF. However, in the latest review, 
started in August 2009, the RBA, despite acknowledging considerable progress towards 
enhancing competition, reached the conclusion that the developments made were not 
sufficient to remove regulation in the sector. 
In parallel, in the US a strong debate on the need to regulate interchange fees for debit cards 
has culminated in what is known as the “Durbin Amendment”187 to the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.188 This provision inserts a new Section 920 into 
the EFTA on Reasonable Fees and Rules for Payment Card Transactions. While the EFTA 
                                                     
183 Frankel, op. cit., p. 60. 
184 Ibid., p. 61. Contra  Chang, Evans and Garcia Swartz, op. cit., p. 20. 
185 Frankel, op. cit., p. 63. Contra Chang, Evans and Garcia Swartz, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
186 RBA, op. cit. 
187 This was submitted on 2.5.2010 and added Section 1075 on Reasonable Fees and Rules for Payment 
Card Transactions to the Dodd-Frank Act. SA 3989, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:SP03989. 
188 Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173; commonly referred to as “Dodd-Frank”, available at: 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/html/PLAW-111publ203.htm. The Act, 
making many changes to the system of financial regulation, was adopted on 21.7.2010. 
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addresses consumer transactions and is meant to protect consumers, and the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection is in charge of most implementing regulations, Section 920 
has to be implemented by the Fed (under Section 904). The Board has the mandate to study 
debit card interchange fees charged by the largest card issuers, and to issue rules regarding 
fees charged to merchants by card companies for debit card transactions. In doing this, the 
Board needs to consult with other agencies. While the Fed has the authority for its role, it 
must take into consideration input from other authorities in charge of financial markets 
and/or products, as well as technology matters (Section 904(B)(1)). 
Moreover, the Durbin Amendment imposes that interchange fees for any electronic debit 
transaction be "reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to 
the transaction",189 and asks the Fed to prescribe regulations to establish standards for 
determining whether fees are “reasonable” and “proportional”. On 20 July 2011, the Board 
set the maximum level of interchange fees for debit card transactions at 21 cents per 
transaction and 5 basis points multiplied by the value of the transaction.190 At the same time, 
issuers implementing certain fraud-prevention measures were allowed to increase their 
interchange fees by as much as one cent. This cap took effect from 1 October 2011. 
Recently trade associations in the retail industry, together with individual retailers, filed a 
claim against the Fed Rules, and received a court decision on 31 July 2013. Interestingly, they 
did not oppose the rules as such, but stated that the Fed had abused its powers by exceeding 
the standards imposed by the Act in the calculation of reasonable fees. According to Section 
920(4), the Fed had to: “(A) consider the functional similarities between (i) electronic debit 
transactions; and (ii) checking transactions that are required within the Federal Reserve bank 
system to clear at par; [and] (B) distinguish between (i) the incremental cost incurred by an 
issuer for the role of the issuer in the authorisation, clearance, or settlement of a particular 
electronic debit transaction, which cost shall be considered under paragraph (2) [i.e., the 
calculation of a reasonable interchange fee] and (ii) other costs incurred by an issuer which 
are not specific to a particular electronic debit transaction, which costs shall not be 
considered under paragraph (2)”. Some adjustments for fraud prevention are also 
established.  
Whereas in a provisional version of the rules the Board had proposed only to include costs 
associated with the authorisation, clearing and settlement (ACS costs) of an electronic debit 
transaction that vary with the number of transactions sent to the issuer within the reporting 
period, in the final rules - under the pressure of the market - it increased the suggested caps 
to also include additional costs “not explicitly excluded from consideration by the statute” 
(those costs which are specific to a particular transaction but are not incremental ACS 
costs).191 
The judge agreed with the plaintiffs that the Durbin Amendment limits the costs allowable to 
the ACS costs. On 26 August 2013, the Fed appealed the decision, and the proceeding is still 
pending. However, besides the technicalities of calculation of “reasonable fees”, the case is of 
interest because it sets the limits under which the Fed can define standards for the market on 
prices. Whereas the RBA acted within its general regulatory powers over the financial sector, 
                                                     
189 An overview of the competition enforcement proceedings and regulatory initiatives in the US 
payment sector can be found in OECD (2012), Policy Roundtable: Competition and Payment Systems, 
Paris, p. 139 et seq. 
190 Final Rule on Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing and Interim Final Rule on Fraud-
Prevention Adjustment. See also Federal Reserve Press Release, of 29.6.2011, available at: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110629a.htm.  
191 § 17 of the decision. 
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the action of the Board is framed within a statutory act and under clear policy lines. 
Although it is hoped that a final decision will recognise an inherent margin of flexibility in 
the Fed’s actions, it is of relevance that the power to influence prices is inserted into a general 
context and is the result of at least consultation, if not coordination with other authorities. 
5. Conclusions 
Payment markets present some similarities with the telecoms sector, where networks 
compete for customers in the retail market, but cooperate in the wholesale market by 
providing call termination (‘network industries’).192 Telecom operators charge access fees 
when customers of other operators use their network. The operators generally agree 
bilaterally on high access fees, thereby committing to artificially high marginal costs and, 
therefore, high call prices. As a result, entry into the telecoms market has no effect on call 
prices paid by customers, and the collusive outcome prevails independently of the market 
structure. This simple comparison shows that competition would not always prevent high 
customer fees being charged. 
From government intervention in network industries, we can learn that an economic case for 
price regulation requires the existence of a market failure.193 From this perspective, the issue 
of whether interchange fees lead to an “overprovision or underprovision of payment card 
services relative to the social optimum”194 should be addressed. According to the governor 
of the RBA, the need to regulate interchange fees results from the observation of empirical 
evidence: the use of credit cards is growing faster than the other and less-expensive means of 
payment.195 This situation, which can be considered the expression of Gresham’s law, is the 
direct consequence of ‘price coherence’. Given that competition in the card payment market 
leads to higher prices, there is a strong case for regulation. 
Some economists196 agree with this but believe that increased competition among issuing 
banks – and not surcharges on card use – would reduce the level of interchange fees. This 
analysis is linked to one of the main arguments in favour of the existence of interchange fees, 
the two-sided market argument. It fails, however, to consider that merchants tend to shift 
onto all customers (independently of the payment instrument they use) the extra costs they 
pay for electronic transactions. Therefore, there is a clear free-riding problem that seems to 
be addressed adequately only by regulatory intervention.197 
Moreover, the idea that greater competition in the industry, together with a reduction in 
switching costs, would lower interchange fees puts too much emphasis on the number of 
customers who would change banks. Only if private individuals were allowed to change 
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accounts automatically, and if number portability were introduced, would switching services 
be likely to enhance competition.198 
Some arguments also lead to the conclusion that a regulatory approach might reduce 
shortcomings of a purely antitrust approach, as they were considered in previous sections. 
First of all, litigation takes too long, and it does not give card brands the legal certainty they 
need to operate in the market. At the same time, decisions by the European Commission and 
national competition authorities may be characterised by a lack of consistency. From this 
point of view, a regulator would be better suited, since it usually has more flexibility in 
designing all structural reforms necessary to enhance competition in the industry. 
Secondly, it is extremely difficult to calculate the exact level of MIFs that maximises social 
welfare and therefore could be exempted. Because of these difficulties, a regulator is in a 
better position to consider these problems than a competition authority, whose action in this 
field risks being qualified as ‘quasi-regulatory’. In this scenario, competition authorities 
would play a complementary role and would act only when their intervention was needed. 
Thirdly, it is evident that public intervention should depend on the level of development of 
the market, since all considerations made until now might apply differently if a country’s 
payments industry is less developed, based almost exclusively on cash and cheques, and in 
need of structural intervention towards electronic means of payment and interoperability, as 
opposed to countries where the payments market is highly mature and the final customer 
can exercise an effective choice among alternative and equally efficient  instruments of 
payment. 
Finally, as we believe has been shown in EU regulation of the sector until now, the structure 
of the market as a whole has to be considered, and issues such as MIFs need to be evaluated 
in a wider context. This wider context would include not only other potentially anti-
competitive clauses, but also the level of concentration of the market, the working of the 
processing infrastructure and access (as the MIF Regulation recognises and regulates, 
although this is not discussed in this paper). These issues – including that of definition of the 
relevant market according to anti-trust standards – would require a wider approach than can 
be taken by competition policy alone. 
On the other hand, competitiveness and contestability of markets are among the goals of 
national payment system oversight, together with efficiency and soundness (avoidance of 
risks for financial stability). These are certainly not meant to interfere with the specific 
antitrust competences of competition authorities, which still need to play a fully-fledged role 
according to the institutional framework of a country. However, the role of a central bank as 
the oversight authority of the national payment system, especially in a country in need of 
strong structural intervention in its financial infrastructure, can fruitfully be that of balancing 
all policy stances and guaranteeing their overall respect. Whereas central banks and 
competition authorities should work in close cooperation to reach these common objectives, 
it seems that the most recent developments in the field of MIFs confirm the results of the 
2008 WB study. 
  
                                                     
198 Ibid., pp. 28-29. As a matter of fact, one standard that the banks participating in the SEPA project 
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